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SOFT SUPREMACY
CORINNA BARRETT LAIN*
ABSTRACT
The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a
decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about
remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this
symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more
realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy
is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The
stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the
strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial
supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent—soft. And the upshot of
soft supremacy is this: we do not need popular constitutionalism,
departmentalism, or any other theory de jour to put the people back
in the Constitution. In numerous and substantial ways, they are
already there.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Special thanks to Eric
Berger, Jud Campbell, Erin Collins, Paul Crane, Jessica Erickson, Barry Friedman, Jim
Gibson, Shari Motro, Jack Preis, Allison Tait, and Kevin Walsh for comments on an earlier
draft, and to Dan Hogan and Kevin Michel for their excellent research assistance and helpful
comments along the way. 
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INTRODUCTION
This symposium contribution offers a descriptive answer to a
normative claim. The normative claim is that judicial supremacy is
antidemocratic; it allows an unelected judiciary to decide issues that
belong to the people themselves, and renders the people powerless
to do anything about it.1 The Constitution belongs to the people,
critics claim—the people wrote it, the people ratified it, and the
people should have a hand in deciding its meaning.2 My descriptive
answer is that they already do.
Those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic
assume that because Supreme Court Justices are unelected, their
constitutional decision-making is separate from, independent of, and
even at odds with the will of the people.3 “[J]udicial supremacy
1. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 242-43 (2004) (discussing “the profoundly anti-democratic attitudes that
underlie modern support for judicial supremacy”); Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique
of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 42 (1993) (“[T]here is something
wrong ... with an insistence that the very rights which the judges are interpreting and
revising are to be put beyond the reach of democratic revision and reinterpretation.”); Norman
R. Williams, The People’s Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257 (2004) (reviewing KRAMER,
supra) (presenting the antijudicial supremacy position as claiming that “the federal judiciary
has usurped the role of we the People in guarding our constitutional commitments. Worse
still, we have accepted that, once the federal courts have spoken, the judiciary’s word on the
matter is final .... [W]e no longer live in a democracy in which the People decide for them-
selves the meaning of the Constitution; we live in an aristocracy in which a cabal of unelected
judges decides for the rest of us what the Constitution means.”); Carson Holloway,
Constitutional Conservatism Rejects Judicial Supremacy, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/02/14410/ [https://perma.cc/3UQV-DB9Q] (“Judicial
supremacy is dangerous: dangerous in some cases to the cause of law and justice, but in all
cases to the American commitment to popular self-government.”).
2. See Edwin Vieira, Jr., Dangers of “Judicial Supremacy,” NEW AM. (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/7636-dangers-of-judicial-
supremacy [https://perma.cc/5W2L-V8PX] (“‘Judicial Supremacy’ contradicts the Declaration
of Independence’s overarching principle of popular sovereignty ... which mandates a govern-
ment (as Abraham Lincoln correctly described it) ‘of the people, by the people, and for the
people,’ not arbitrary rule by judicial (or any other) elitists responsible to no one but them-
selves.”); id. (“‘Judiciary supremacy’ thus challenges ‘We the People’ to reassert their own
control over the power of construing their own Constitution.”); see also sources cited supra
note 1 (noting claims that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic).
3. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 7 (2007)
(“The judiciary’s authority to set its opinions about the correct meaning of the Constitution
above those of Congress, the president, or the electorate is at the root of judicial supremacy....
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leaves us with no meaningful opportunity to participate in constitu-
tional interpretation,”4 one critic writes, and this is the crux of the
claim—that judicial supremacy affords the people no say in constitu-
tional decision-making on the front side and no control over what
has been decided on the backside.5 The Court decides the issue and
it gets the last word. Hence the depiction of an imperial Supreme
Court.6 
But this is not the Supreme Court we have, and it is not how
judicial supremacy actually works. In theory, the Court might be
insulated from the will of the people, but in reality, its constitu-
tional decision-making is inextricably intertwined with the will of
the people, channeling the views of political and popular majorities
in numerous ways. And in theory, the Court might have the last
word on what the Constitution means, but in reality, its constitu-
tional pronouncements are final only to the extent that the people
and their representatives are willing to accept them, giving political
and practical majorities control of a ruling’s staying power in
numerous ways.
The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little
of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse of those
who oppose it on democratic grounds. Judicial supremacy is porous,
[I]t is this elite rejection of popular judgments on deeply contested matters of fundamental
political principle that is the most troubling aspect.”); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 198 (2004) (noting the
“need at the outset to disabuse ourselves of the picture ... in which the legislature is us, and
the constitutional judiciary is them—an external mechanism intervening in our affairs”). 
4. Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 777 (2008)
(“[J]udicial supremacy exacts a big price, for it comes at the expense of popular sovereignty.
‘We the People’ are the ultimate sovereign in our constitutional order, but judicial supremacy
leaves us with no meaningful opportunity to participate in constitutional interpretation,
except perhaps through efforts to amend the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)).
5. See supra notes 1-4.
6. As Mark Graber notes in his contribution to this symposium, “Participants in the
debate over the proper allocation of constitutional authority dispute whether an imperial
judiciary with the power to resolve (almost) all constitutional disputes is desirable, but not
whether the United States actually has an imperial judiciary with the power to resolve
(almost) all constitutional disputes.” Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy Revisited:
Independent Constitutional Authority in American Constitutional Law and Practice, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2017); see also Stephen Griffin, Departmentalism: What Went
Wrong?, BALKINIZATION (June 19, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/departmentalism-
what-went-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/6E34-45Z3] (noting “the imperialism connoted by ‘su-
premacy’”).
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contingent—soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is this: we do not
need popular constitutionalism, departmentalism, or any other
theory de jour to put the people back in the Constitution. In a
myriad of ways, they are already there.
I am not the first to recognize the power of the people in the
Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making; a rich body of
scholarship has demonstrated the point across a variety of domains.
My aim here is to bring together the various strands of this
scholarship to construct an accurate conception of the reality of
judicial supremacy—one that stands in sharp contrast to the grossly
oversimplified theoretical account that is all too common in judicial
supremacy debates. In the end, my hope is to push the conversation
in a more realistic direction. I want those who make claims about
judicial supremacy to take on the concept as it actually exists.
Mainly, I am talking to departmentalists in this project—those
who claim that the representative branches have equal authority to
say what the Constitution means and are therefore not bound by
what the Supreme Court says.7 Not all departmentalists oppose
judicial supremacy on democratic grounds, but many do, and even
those who do not are prone to depict judicial supremacy in a
formalistic fashion.8 Indeed, what some portray as the advantages
of departmentalism instead describes the world of judicial suprem-
acy as it actually exists.9 That world has unique implications for the
7. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 678 (describing departmentalism as the view
“that every branch of government should interpret the Constitution and that every branch’s
interpretation is equally authoritative”); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at xi (noting
that departmentalism is the primary alternative to judicial supremacy and describing the
departmentalist position).
8. See James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the
Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1378-80 (2005) (noting
that not all departmentalists are populists, just as not all populists are departmentalists);
David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047,
2063-64 (2010) (discussing the various versions of departmentalism). 
9. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 78 (1993) (arguing that the advantage of
departmentalism is that “interpretive power is shared among the branches, and the courts
are seen as being engaged in a continuing conversation with the political branches over the
proper understanding of law”); see also id. at 76 (“Stripped of the power to bind the other
branches with rules of law, the courts would have to attend more carefully to the views of the
more politically accountable branches, and limit themselves to rulings likely to secure volun-
tary acceptance by these branches.”). For a discussion of the same attributes as components
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departmentalist position, so at the end of the discussion I direct my
comments specifically to those inclined to the departmentalist view.
But to be clear, the implications of recognizing judicial supremacy
for what it is, as opposed to what constitutional theory posits it to
be, are broader than the departmentalist position that is my
primary aim. Some defend judicial supremacy on the belief that
“[s]ome questions—questions of justice and rights—are too impor-
tant to be left in the hands of legislative majorities or ‘the people
themselves.’”10 Others, those loosely dubbed “popular constitutional-
ists,” oppose judicial supremacy based on the flip side of that
claim—the belief that questions of justice and rights are too
important not to be left in the hands of legislative majorities and
the people themselves.11 Both positions assume that the Supreme
Court’s constitutional decision-making is separate from, and inde-
pendent of, the people and their representatives. Soft supremacy
challenges that assumption, showing how porous the line between
the Supreme Court on the one hand, and the people and their
representatives on the other, actually is.
In the end, my point is this: if we are going to debate the merits
of judicial supremacy, we at least ought to do so based on an ac-
curate conception of how it operates, and that means recognizing the
role of the people and their representatives in the constitutional
decision-making process. To that end, Part I surveys the various
avenues of influence that the people and their representatives have
on the front side of constitutional decision-making, and Part II
surveys the various avenues of control that the people and their
representatives have on the backside of constitutional decision-
making. In Part III, I explore three implications of this largely
descriptive account, discussing what soft supremacy does for our
democratic discourse, what it does for the people themselves, and
what it does for the representative branches. In light of what ju-
dicial supremacy does for the representative branches, I ultimately
of soft supremacy, see infra Part I.C (discussing the constitutional dialogue between the
Supreme Court and the representative branches), and Part II.D (discussing the Supreme
Court’s need to consider the views of the representative branches in order to enforce its
rulings).
10. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 8-9 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
11. See sources cited supra note 1.
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ask whether departmentalism is good for even departmentalists
(spoiler alert: the answer is no). In the end, the notion of “power to
the people”12 is not the problem with opposition to judicial suprem-
acy on democratic grounds. The problem is its failure to recognize
the power that the people have now—a power that lies at the heart
of soft supremacy.
I. “WE THE PEOPLE” IN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING
Critics of judicial supremacy claim that “the people should have
a major role to play in constitutional interpretation.”13 In this Part,
I challenge the assumption that they do not have that now,
surveying the various avenues by which the people and their rep-
resentatives shape constitutional decision-making and influence
the content of constitutional law. Scholars have been exploring
these avenues for decades, in part to explain a somewhat inconve-
nient fact for those who think judicial supremacy is antithetical to
democratic rule: since at least the 1930s, the Supreme Court’s
decision-making has been roughly as reflective of the will of the
people as that of the representative branches.14 To be clear, my focus
here is on inputs in the constitutional decision-making process
12. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2004) (“As an abstraction [popular constitutionalism] sounds
great; ‘power to the people’ always has appeal.”); see also Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More
Judicial Activism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERA-
TION 11, 11 (Giorgi Areshidze et al. eds., 2016) (“Taking the Constitution away from the
courts—and giving it back to the people—has become a rallying cry.”). 
13. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1045, 1050 n.26 (2004) (defining the core claim of popular constitutionalism and surmising
that departmentalism is substantially the same).
14. Both produce results consistent with public opinion around two-thirds of the time. See
THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 97 (1989) (comparing nearly
150 national public opinion polls to the Supreme Court’s decisions on those issues and
concluding that “[w]hen a clear poll majority or plurality exists, over three-fifths of the Court’s
decisions reflect the polls. By the available evidence, the modern Supreme Court appears to
reflect public opinion as accurately as other policy makers.”); id. at 80 (comparing the policy
outcomes issued by Congress and the executive branch, which the public supported 64 to 68
percent of the time in public opinion polls, and concluding, “[a]gainst these comparisons, the
modern Court appears neither markedly more nor less consistent with the polls than are
other policy makers”); see also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST
COURT 2-3 (2008) (“This book suggests that the Rehnquist Court was consistent with public
opinion in three-fifths to two-thirds of its decisions—roughly as often as were earlier Courts
since the 1930s.”).
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rather than outputs—but the two are not unrelated. Think the
Supreme Court’s long-standing ability to reflect the views of the
American people just happens by accident? A more likely explana-
tion is that the people’s views are somehow making their way into
the Court’s constitutional decision-making process. Here are the
primary means by which I think this happens.
A. The Judicial Appointments Process
The judicial appointments process is the conventional explanation
for the Supreme Court’s responsiveness to the views of popular and
political majorities.15 The Justices may not be elected, but the Pres-
idents who nominate them and the senators who confirm them are,
and the idea here is that these elected representatives use the ap-
pointments process to stock the bench with jurists who share their
constitutional views.16 Over time, this process allows political major-
ities—and by extension, the popular majorities who elected them—
to shape the Court’s decision-making in ways that reflect their own
constitutional understandings.17 In short, by controlling the Su-
preme Court’s composition, the people and their representatives
15. For the seminal account of this theory, see generally Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); see
also William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model and
Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POLITICS 169, 171 (1996)
(recognizing the judicial-appointments process as the “conventional explanation of the
relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions”).
16. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 87 (“[T]he political appointment process by which
federal judges are selected links them to dominant electoral coalitions. Affiliated leaders will
expect to place like-minded judges on the bench and can expect that earlier affiliated leaders
did the same. If so, then judicial understandings of the Constitution are likely to be broadly
convergent with political understandings.”); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 38 (1993) (“[T]he people’s
elected representatives ... nominate and confirm prospective justices whom they have good
reason to believe share and can be expected to sustain their constitutional and policy
preferences.”).
17. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People: Probing the
Dynamics and Uncertainties of American Constitutionalism, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 663, 671
(“When the voters choose one party over another, especially when they do so with some
consistency over a series of elections, that party will be able to fill the bench with its
ideological adherents, and the federal courts will consequently reshape the law to reflect the
basic policies and values of that party.”).
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have tremendous influence on its constitutional decision-making as
a matter of institutional design.18
Granted, the judicial appointments process is far from perfect in
this regard. Sometimes Presidents make appointment “mistakes,”
thinking nominees embrace a particular set of constitutional com-
mitments when in fact they do not.19 Sometimes nominees are
exactly who Presidents think they are, but then change when they
get on the bench—or conversely, do not change when the country
does.20 Sometimes Presidents are of the same political party that
controls the Senate, allowing for off-center, ideological appointments
to appease the party base.21 And sometimes Presidents do not have
18. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way Judges
Think and the Way Judges Act, in NORMS AND THE LAW 139, 150-51 (John N. Drobak ed.,
2006) (“[O]utcomes vary with the values and attitudes of particular judges. Otherwise, why
would anybody care who gets on the Supreme Court?... [E]verybody knows that Scalia and
Thomas are not the same as Ginsburg or Stevens.”); see also NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER,
THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 61 (2d ed. 2015) (“The battleground over Supreme Court
nominations reveals that the President and the Senate both recognize that the best way to
shape outputs (Court rulings) is to control inputs (who sits on the Court).”).
19. Illustrating the point, Dwight Eisenhower was reportedly asked whether he felt he
had made any mistakes during his presidency. “Yes, two,” he replied, “and they are both
sitting on the Supreme Court.” See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE:
HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 11 (2004) (quoting HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINT-
MENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 200 (new and rev. ed. 1999)); see also Jason DeParle,
In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says, Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/06/27/politics/in-battle-to-pick-next-justice-right-says-avoid-a-
kennedy.html [https://perma.cc/T47Q-6CX6] (discussing Justices who have disappointed the
Presidents who appointed them, including Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy,
and Souter).
20. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 24 (2008) (discussing “‘ideology drift’—
the tendency of judges to depart from the political stance (liberal or conservative) of the party
of the President who appointed them the longer they serve”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-
Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 159 (2012) (“Supreme Court Justices have a judicial
life expectancy much longer than those who put them on the bench, so their views could easily
differ from the prevailing ideology of any given moment.”).
21. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2609-10 (2003) (“Even when politics motivates presidents, judicial appointments can and are
used to appease numerous constituencies, including those that may well fall outside the
mainstream. Recently, for example, Republican presidents have searched for judges of a
strong conservative ideology, so much so that they may well be out of the center of public
opinion.”); Lain, supra note 20, at 159 (noting that when the same party controls the
presidency and Senate, “party polarization may lead to off-center judicial appointments as
presidents and senators increasingly look to appease their party base”). 
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the opportunity to put their mark on the bench at all.22 There are a
host of reasons why the judicial appointments process may fail to
produce a Supreme Court that reflects the people’s views—including
the possibility that prior judicial appointments were all too success-
ful in doing just that.23
But this is not to say, as some have, that the judicial appoint-
ments process provides a mere “scintilla of democratic respectability
in the constitution of judicial power.”24 To the contrary, the Ameri-
can people recognize the appointments process for what it is—a way
to influence the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making.
That is why judicial appointments have become part of electoral pol-
itics; the people understand this channel of influence and the ability
it gives them, through their representatives, to influence the Court’s
constitutional views.
Consider the role that the judicial appointments process played
in the 2016 presidential election. At the Democratic National Con-
vention (DNC), Hillary Clinton accepted her party’s nomination
with a promise to “appoint Supreme Court justices who will get
money out of politics and expand voting rights, not restrict them.”25
Bernie Sanders’s speech at the DNC put the issue in broader,
starker terms, telling supporters, “If you don’t believe that this
election is important, if you think you can sit it out, take a moment
to think about the Supreme Court justices that Donald Trump
would nominate and what that would mean to civil liberties, equal
22. The average tenure for Supreme Court Justices is now just over twenty-six years,
creating the possibility of long periods of time—as was the case between 1994 and mid-
2005—without a new Supreme Court appointment. See Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 769, 770-73 (2006) (discussing the phenomenon of the Justices’ increasingly long
tenures and making the case for term limits as a response). 
23. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066-67 (2001) (considering the appointment of Supreme Court Justices
as a means of “partisan entrenchment” allowing current political majorities to prevent future
political majorities from fully implementing adverse policy objectives); Howard Gillman,
How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the
United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 512, 521-22 (2002) (discussing judiciary
entrenchment as a means of enforcing the constitutional commitments of a prior governing
regime against new political majorities).
24. Waldron, supra note 1, at 43. 
25. Transcript: Hillary Clinton’s Speech at the Democratic Convention, N.Y. TIMES (July
28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/us/politics/hillary-clinton-dnc-transcript.html
[https://perma.cc/5CR5-EAKK].
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rights and the future of our country.”26 For their part, delegates at
the Republican National Convention cited the importance of en-
suring a conservative majority on the Supreme Court as the “best
reason” to support Trump,27 while conservative commentators dub-
bed the appointment of Supreme Court Justices as the most
important issue of the 2016 presidential election.28 In 2016, voters
were asked to choose not just a President, but also a constitutional
worldview, and the results of that election will undoubtedly in-
fluence the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making for
years to come.
In fairness, the importance of the judicial appointments process
in the 2016 election was likely exaggerated by Justice Scalia’s open
seat and its potential to alter the ideological balance of the Su-
preme Court.29 But the role of judicial appointments in presidential
elections is not particularly anomalous. Witness Richard Nixon cam-
paigning in 1968 on a promise to appoint conservative, “law and
order” Justices to the Supreme Court,30 and Ronald Reagan
26. Transcript: Bernie Sanders’s Full Speech at the 2016 DNC, WASH. POST (July 26,
2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/26/transcript-bernie-
sanderss-full-speech-at-the-2016-dnc/ [https://perma.cc/WC59-32XP].
27. See Chad Livengood & Jonathan Oosting, Supreme Court Pick a Rallying Cry at GOP
Convention, DETROIT NEWS (July 20, 2016, 9:48 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/
politics/2016/07/20/gop-leaders-trump-support/87320632/ [https://perma.cc/6ZFZ-6EG5].
28. See Hugh Hewitt, Most Important Issue of 2016: The Judiciary, HUGH HEWITT SHOW
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.hughhewitt.com/important-issue-2016-judiciary/ [https://perma.cc/
HBQ8-GVFZ]; see also Alvin Rabushka, Opinion, If Hillary Clinton Gets Her Way with the
Supreme Court, NEWSWEEK (May 24, 2016, 12:33 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/if-hillary-
clinton-gets-way-supreme-court-463140 [https://perma.cc/3AH9-E2R6] (discussing the damage
Hillary Clinton could inflict if she wins the presidential election and has the power to appoint
Justices to the Supreme Court). For a biting commentary on the Republican Party’s treatment
of its “most important” issue, see Dahlia Lithwick, Justices Ignored, SLATE (July 21, 2016,
4:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/07/the_gop_
refuses_to_talk_about_the_supreme_court_at_the_rnc.html [https://perma.cc/TBG3-YE5G]
(“The Supreme Court is the most important issue of the election for Republicans. So they’re
not talking about it.”).
29. Even Rolling Stone was talking about it. See David S. Cohen, The Biggest Thing at
Stake in the 2016 Election, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/news/the-biggest-thing-at-stake-in-the-2016-election-20151009 [https://perma.cc/
ZH64-5XTY].
30. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 97-98 (1999) (noting that Nixon “increased the
stakes for all subsequent Supreme Court nominations by making the Supreme Court a central
issue in his 1968 presidential campaign” and discussing his campaign promise to appoint
“only conservative ‘law and order’ judges”). 
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campaigning in 1980 on a promise to appoint Supreme Court
Justices who would overturn (or at least undermine) Roe v. Wade.31
It does not happen all the time, but it does happen from time to
time—the power of the people to shape constitutional law through
the judicial appointments process becomes an explicit part of the
electoral process itself. 
In the wake of the 2016 election, one might reasonably conclude
that this sort of politicization of the judicial appointments process
is a bad thing, illustrating the danger of judicial supremacy.
Presidential elections should be about Presidents, not the Supreme
Court, the argument goes, but in a world where the Court gets the
last word, voters may well decide that the stakes of constitutional
decision-making are too high not to vote the party line. As one of my
readers put the point, “Judicial supremacy just helped elect a man
widely viewed as unfit to be President, and that should give us
pause about being a judicial supremacist.”32
This strikes me as a fair point (albeit a debatable one)33—but note
the essence of the claim. The claim is that the Supreme Court is so
powerful that the people are doing too much to influence its
decision-making, rather than not enough (or, as the standard script
would have it, nothing at all). As Miguel Schor notes, judicial
31. See Lynn D. Wardle, Judicial Appointments to the Lower Federal Courts: The Ultimate
Arbiters of the Abortion Doctrine, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V.
WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 215, 228-29 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987) (“President
Reagan took office committed to appointing federal judges who recognize the basic worth of
all human life and who believe in the constitutional allocation of decision-making power to
elected state representatives. The 1980 Republican Party platform emphasized these very
points .... Again, in 1984, the Republican Party platform reiterated this position.”); see also
Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2067 (2011) (noting the irony of Ronald Reagan running on a
promise to appoint judges who would “respect human life and traditional family values” in his
1980 presidential campaign in light of the fact that, as governor of California, he had signed
into law a statute liberalizing access to abortion).
32. Larry Kramer has made a similar point. See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitu-
tionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 1009 (2004) (“[The Founders] would have been
incredulous if told (as we are often told today) that the main reason to worry about who
becomes President is that the winner will control judicial appointments. Something would
have gone terribly wrong ... if an unelected judiciary were being given that kind of importance
and deference.”). 
33. See Pozen, supra note 8, at 2072 (noting that engagement of an energized public in the
judicial appointments process helps sustain the democratic legitimacy of constitutional law);
see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (applying the same reasoning to the depart-
mentalist view).
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supremacy has not disempowered the people; to the contrary, it has
mobilized them to ensure that their constitutional commitments are
represented on the bench.34 This may at times distort the electoral
process (although it is hard to view the elections of Nixon and
Reagan that way, or for that matter, anyone other than Trump). But
look how far we have come—from a claim that the judicial appoint-
ments process offers but a scintilla of democratic accountability to
a claim that it invites too much.
In the end, the judicial appointments process is one way the
people have a hand in shaping the content of constitutional law, but
it is not a foolproof way. It is not an uncomplicated way. And most
importantly, it is not the only way. When it comes to the role of the
people in constitutional decision-making, we are just getting
started. 
B. Constitutional Doctrine
The content of constitutional law turns on the application of
constitutional doctrine, and the Supreme Court’s constitutional
doctrine works to ratify democratic outcomes in numerous ways.
Here I illustrate the point with three examples: rational basis
review, constitutional decision-making that relies on state legisla-
tive consensus, and the Court’s justiciability doctrines.
1. Rational Basis Review
The most obvious way in which constitutional doctrine works to
ratify democratic outcomes is the Supreme Court’s use of the
rational basis standard to judge legislation challenged under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.35 In both constitutional
34. See Miguel Schor, Squaring the Circle: Democratizing Judicial Review and the
Counter-Constitutional Difficulty, 16 MINN. J. INT’L L. 61, 91 (2007) (“The Supreme Court’s
assertion of supremacy did not debilitate the people, but rather mobilized them to seek to
place their partisans on the Court.”).
35. Although my focus is use of the rational basis standard in the due process and equal
protection contexts, where it is deeply entrenched and well known, it is worth noting that
rational basis review can be found in a number of other constitutional contexts as well. See
John Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Independence in a Democracy: Institutionalizing
Judicial Restraint, in NORMS AND THE LAW, supra note 18, at 161, 205 (“Indeed, the use of
rational basis scrutiny is ubiquitous in constitutional law, liberating most of what government
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contexts, the rational basis standard is the default standard of
scrutiny for legislation that does not impinge upon a fundamental
right or protected class of individuals.36 As others have recognized,
the practice of judicial review largely entails application of the
rational basis standard, which governs the vast majority of chal-
lenges to government action.37
Under the rational basis standard, legislation need only be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government interest to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.38 In practice, this standard is more deferen-
tial yet. Legislation subject to rational basis review enjoys “a strong
presumption of validity” and will be upheld if there is any conceiv-
able basis to sustain it39—even if not supported by the legislative
history or facts of the case, and even if regarded as “stupid.”40 Given
this deferential standard, it should come as no surprise that rational
basis review results in the vast majority of what the representative
branches do being left to the the representative branches.
does from serious judicial oversight whether it be under the Due Process Clause, the Takings
Clause, the Contract Clause, or the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
36. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld ... if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”).
37. See Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 746-47 (“[I]n most constitutional cases, the Court uses
extremely deferential review. Judicial review primarily involves the application of the rational
basis test.”); see also SAGER, supra note 3, at 90 (“Outside the comparatively narrow areas
where the Court has adopted a stance of active constitutional oversight, a tradition of judicial
restraint reigns.”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 35, at 205 (noting the ubiquity of rational
basis scrutiny in constitutional law).
38. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
39. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313-15; see also id. at 313-14 (noting that “equal
protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices” and assuming that “even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we may think a political branch has acted” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 43,
97 (1979))); id. at 314 (“This standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.”).
40. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[A]s I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on
numerous occasions: ‘The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid
laws.’”); Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (“[I]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the
legislature.... In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).
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Particularly relevant in the context of the current discussion is
why—why a Supreme Court with the power to override the will of
the people instead employs a default standard that almost always
lets them have their way. The reason, as the Court itself has made
clear, is respect for the representative branches.41 The extreme
permissibility of the rational basis standard reflects a conscious
recognition of the primacy of democratic decision-making, even
within the Court’s constitutional decision-making domain.
2. Constitutional Decision-Making Based on State Legislative
Consensus
My second example of how the Supreme Court’s constitutional
doctrine works to ratify democratic outcomes is the Court’s use of
state legislative consensus to identify and apply constitutional
rights.42 The phenomenon of state counting—tallying state legisla-
tive positions and then using the majority position of the states to
determine what the Constitution requires—is well known in the
death penalty context. This is the Court’s “evolving standards of
decency” doctrine,43 and as a few scholars have noted, the Court’s
more recent substantive due process cases employ state counting
41. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42 (“[T]he courts have been very reluctant, as
they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to
closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests
should be pursued.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s rational basis review of congressional statutes under the
Commerce Clause “reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress on a
subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the legitimacy that
comes from Congress’s political accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range
of possible choices”).
42. For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Corinna Barrett Lain,
The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009).
43. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005) (discussing the importance of
determining whether a “national consensus” exists under the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving
standards of decency” doctrine and noting that “[t]he beginning point [of analysis under the
doctrine] is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question”); see also Lain, supra note 42,
at 366 (“Under the [evolving standards of decency] doctrine, a punishment violates the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause when a ‘national consensus’ has formed against it,
prohibiting a punishment only after a majority of states have already done so on their own.”
(footnote omitted)).
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as well.44 But by and large, scholars have missed the vast extent to
which the Court relies on state legislative consensus to decide
questions of constitutional law.
In the due process context, for example, the Supreme Court has
used state legislative consensus to identify fundamental rights
that trigger heightened scrutiny,45 to determine whether punitive
damage awards are excessive,46 to identify which constitutional
provisions in the Bill of Rights are incorporated to the states,47
44. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 124-33 (2006) (recognizing an implicit doctrine of “evolving national values” in the
Supreme Court’s most recent substantive due process cases, and pointing to the Eighth
Amendment “evolving standards of decency” doctrine as precedent and guidance for
developing the doctrine); Michael W. McConnell, Lecture, Tradition and Constitutionalism
Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 174 (noting that although constitutional
theory has been dominated by originalist and moral reasoning approaches, in practice a third
approach has appeared—one grounded on “the gradually evolving moral principles of the
nation” and exemplified by the Court’s substantive due process decisions); Benjamin J.
Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in
Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 382 (2006) (noting “striking similarities” between
substantive due process analysis in recent cases and Eighth Amendment evolving standards
analysis, and the absence of similar doctrinal developments elsewhere).
45. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (invalidating the criminalization
of same sex sodomy based on a fundamental right to engage in such conduct in private, and
basing analysis on state legislative landscape and legislative trends); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-21 (1997) (denying the right to physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill, competent adults based on the state legislative landscape and noting that only
those liberties “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” qualify as fundamental,
with “[t]he primary and most reliable indication” being “the pattern of enacted laws” (first
quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and then
quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005))); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1989) (denying fundamental
right status to paternity claim based on examination of state legislative landscape).
46. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583-84 (1996) (considering statutory
penalties authorized for comparable conduct in other jurisdictions to determine whether
punitive damages award was excessive and thus prohibited by the Due Process Clause).
47. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury based on majority position of the states); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause based on
majority position of the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (incorporating
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on majority position of the states); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against the
states based on majority position of the states); see also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (noting in context of incorporation of the right to a jury that “[d]oubts
must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions,
but by objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the
community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments”).
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to identify what procedural due process requires,48 to determine
whether a defendant has had notice and the opportunity to be
heard,49 and to answer constitutional questions relating to burdens
of proof.50 
In the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has likewise
used state legislative consensus to identify fundamental rights that
trigger heightened scrutiny,51 but more common here is the Court’s
use of state legislative consensus to determine whether a challenged
classification survives the application of heightened review. How do
we know whether the challenged classification is supported by a
compelling state interest? Just ask whether other states have also
recognized the importance of that issue.52 How do we know whether
48. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
64-65 (2009) (rejecting procedural due process challenge based on survey of similar state
practices); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748-52 (2006) (same); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
37, 46-49, 51 (1996) (plurality opinion) (same); see also Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640
(1991) (rejecting a procedural due process challenge based on the rationale that if the
procedure was truly inconsistent with due process, most states would not be using it); Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266-68 (1984) (same).
49. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991) (counting states to invalidate
statutory scheme that allowed for prejudgment attachment of real estate without notice); Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-80 (1985) (counting states to support holding that a trial court’s
refusal to appoint psychiatrist to support an indigent defendant’s mental health claim
deprived the defendant of the opportunity to present a fair defense); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 612-13, 612 n.20 (1979) (counting states to validate state’s truncated procedure for
committing juveniles to state mental hospital).
50. See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1987) (relying on “[t]he collective
judgment of the many state legislatures” in determining what due process requires and noting
that “a principal reason for any constitutionally mandated departure from the preponderance
standard has been the adoption of a more exacting burden of proof by the majority of
jurisdictions”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 749 n.3 (1982) (counting states to hold
that due process is not satisfied by the preponderance of evidence standard in termination of
parental rights proceedings); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426-27 (1979) (counting states
to hold that due process is not satisfied by the preponderance of evidence standard in
involuntary civil commitment proceedings); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (relying on “the nearly complete ... acceptance of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard by the states” to hold that due process is not satisfied by the preponderance of evidence
standard in criminal proceedings).
51. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797, 804-06 (1997) (relying on the majority
position of the states to find that there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide under the
Equal Protection Clause).
52. See, e.g., id. at 804-05 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to state’s ban on
assisted suicide and relying on the fact that “the overwhelming majority of state legislatures”
have done the same thing); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 633 (1996) (invalidating a
state constitutional amendment that prohibited protection on the basis of sexual orientation
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a challenged classification is narrowly tailored, or substantially
related, to a given state interest? Just look to see what other states
have done.53
The Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making in the First,
Fourth, and Sixth Amendment contexts likewise illustrates the
point. In the First Amendment context, the Court has used state
legislative consensus to judge the importance of the government
interest supporting a regulation and the legitimacy of the state’s
chosen means to serve it.54 Here the Court has also used state
legislative consensus to make threshold determinations as to
whether certain categories of speech are outside the ambit of First
and noting that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character” require careful consideration,
even under rational basis review (alteration in original) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928))); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326-28 (1993) (relying on
the majority position of the states to uphold a classification that treated mentally retarded
and mentally ill patients differently for the purposes of involuntary commitment, and noting
the fact “[t]hat the law has long treated the classes as distinct, ... suggests that there is a
commonsense distinction” along the lines that the classification has drawn); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1973) (relying on the majority position of the
states to uphold a state’s unequal allocation of funding among school districts, and noting that
there must be a rational basis for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil
expenditure because this is the system “employed in virtually every other State”).
53. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-09, 209 n.22 (1976) (invalidating gender
distinctions in state regulation of sale of alcohol, noting that “[t]he repeal of most of these
laws signals society’s perception of the unfairness and questionable constitutionality of
singling out groups to bear the brunt of alcohol regulation”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666 n.4, 670 (1966) (invalidating a poll tax under Equal Protection Clause
analysis and considering the fact that “only a handful of States today condition the franchise
on the payment of a poll tax”).
54. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 701-02 (1994) (invalidating a school
district that tracked denominational lines, noting that it was “exceptional to the point of
singularity”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788-89, 794 (1983) (upholding the state
practice of opening a legislative session with a prayer by a chaplain paid from public funds,
noting that the practice has “been followed consistently in most of the states” and that “many
state legislatures and the United States Congress provide compensation for their chaplains”);
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a state provision
barring ministers from serving as delegates, noting that “[t]oday Tennessee remains the only
State excluding ministers from certain public offices”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S.
664, 676 (1970) (upholding a state tax exemption for realty owned for religious purposes,
stating, “[a]ll of the 50 States provide for tax exemption of places of worship, most of them
doing so by constitutional guarantees.... Few concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric
of our national life”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws, stating, “[a]lmost every State in our country presently has some type of Sunday
regulation and over forty possess a relatively comprehensive system”).
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Amendment protection altogether.55 In the Fourth Amendment
context, the Court has used state legislative consensus to determine
whether certain police conduct constitutes an unreasonable search
or seizure.56 And in the Sixth Amendment context, the Court has
used the same doctrinal approach to determine the contours of the
right to trial by jury.57
This is not to say that the Supreme Court always polls the states
in its constitutional decision-making, or even that it does so most of
the time.58 And this is not to say that the Court always uses state
legislative consensus in the same way; sometimes it counts states
to identify constitutional rights, other times just to apply them. But
the basic point remains: across vast swaths of constitutional law,
the Court relies on the majority position of state legislatures to
determine what the Constitution requires. 
That does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court’s
decision-making in these cases is majoritarian.59 As discussed below,
55. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982) (excluding child pornography
from First Amendment protection based on legislation criminalizing it in virtually every
state); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (excluding obscenity from First
Amendment protection based on “the [nearly] universal judgment that obscenity should be
restrained” as reflected by obscenity laws in forty-eight states); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 255 (1952) (excluding libel from First Amendment protection based on recognition
that libel is punished in every state).
56. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 n.14 (2001) (upholding arrest
for a nonjailable offense under Fourth Amendment challenge, and noting a reluctance to
invalidate a practice that “has continued to receive the support of many state legislatures”);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985) (finding Fourth Amendment violation when the
police used deadly force against a nonviolent felon, and noting that “[i]n evaluating the
reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have also looked to
prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 600
(1980) (holding that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entry into the home and
relying, in part, on “the clear consensus among the States,” noting that “custom and
contemporary norms necessarily play ... a large role in the constitutional analysis”).
57. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134, 138 (1979) (invalidating nonunan-
imous six-member juries because the “near-uniform judgment of the Nation provides a useful
guide in delimiting the line between those jury practices that are constitutionally permissible
and those that are not”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (stressing the im-
portance of “objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation” in jury
trial analysis); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1937) (noting that jury
trial analysis must be governed by “objective standards such as may be observed in the laws
and practices of the community”).
58. See Lain, supra note 42, at 406-08 (discussing differences in the frequency and
formality of state-counting across doctrinal contexts).
59. By majoritarian, I mean consistent with the will of the people at the national level.
1628 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1609
there is reason to doubt legislation as a proxy for the will of the
people (although there is also reason to think state legislation
may do a better job than federal legislation in that regard, partic-
ularly when a majority of state legislatures come to the same con-
clusion).60 But again, the point of the discussion is not outputs; it is
inputs. And on that score, the point is this: when the Supreme Court
uses state legislative consensus to decide contested questions of con-
stitutional law, it is expressly relying on the people’s considered
judgments, as reflected in the results of their own democratic
processes, to interpret the Constitution—and that is about as rep-
resentative as nonrepresentative decision-making can get.
Granted, the Supreme Court is still the one doing the deciding. It
can ignore state legislative consensus at will. But it is difficult to
claim that the Supreme Court has taken away the people’s say in
constitutional decision-making when across vast swaths of doctrine
the Court is literally taking what the people have said to make its
decisions.
3. Justiciability Doctrines
Thus far, I have discussed constitutional doctrines that defer to
the will of the people (rational basis review) and adopt the will of
the people (state legislative consensus), but there is a third cate-
gory that leaves the actual decision-making to the people: the
justiciability doctrines. The justiciability doctrines are a collection
of “techniques and allied devices for staying the Court’s hand,”61 an
Clearly, when the Supreme Court counts states and constitutionalizes the majority position,
its ruling is countermajoritarian for the minority of states whose position is being suppressed.
That poses serious federalism concerns, but it does not pose a countermajoritarian problem,
at least as the term has been conventionally understood. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of
an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112
YALE L.J. 153, 174-75 (2002) (“For almost all academic commentators ... the relevant question
was whether a national majority supported a Court decision.... Among the broader public it
also was the national majority that mattered.”).
60. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 652 (1948) (“No national authority, however be-
nevolent, ... can be as closely in touch with those who are governed as can the local authorities
in the several states and their subdivisions.”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 1019
(“Many have defended federalism on the ground that state and local governments are closer
to the people and thus more responsive to public needs and concerns.”). For a discussion of the
reasons to doubt legislation as a proxy for the will of the people, see infra Part III.B.
61. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword—The Passive Virtues,
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assortment of self-imposed restraints designed to take the judiciary
out of the decision-making process altogether. Although generally
justified as a matter of institutional competency and separation of
powers, the justiciability doctrines have clear implications for the
point I aim to make, for they leave the resolution of a number of
constitutional questions in the hands of the people themselves. 
The political question doctrine is perhaps the best example.
Constitutional questions relating to foreign policy, the political
process, impeachment, and the like—“[q]uestions[ ] in their nature
political”62—have been deemed by the Supreme Court to be ill-suited
for judicial resolution, leaving the representative branches to decide
for themselves what the Constitution requires.63 Granted, the Court
still decides whether the political question doctrine applies in the
first instance,64 and the doctrine is more erratic and less theorized
than a number of scholars would like.65 But it has resulted in entire
categories of constitutional decision-making being removed from
the judiciary’s purview and given to the representative branches.66
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 51 (1961).
62. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (“Questions, in their nature
political, ... can never be made in this court.”). For sample cases, see Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding that whether the Senate had properly conducted an
impeachment trial is a political question not subject to judicial resolution); O’Brien v. Brown,
409 U.S. 1, 5 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that whether delegates were properly seated at the
1972 Democratic National Convention is a nonjusticiable political question); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937) (holding that whether a foreign government can be
recognized is a nonjusticiable political question); and Commercial Tr. Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S.
51, 57 (1923) (holding that whether war has begun or ended is a nonjusticiable political
question); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that
partisan gerrymandering claims are political questions and thus nonjusticiable).
63. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83 (2008) (“The political questions
doctrine does not mean that Congress is totally unconstrained by the Constitution in the
areas it identifies. Rather, it means that Congress conclusively determines what the
Constitution means in those areas.”).
64. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244 (2002) (“To be sure,
the courts still determine which branch decides the question, so there is an initial evaluation
by the judiciary even when the political question doctrine applies.”).
65. See, e.g., id. at 275 (lamenting the Supreme Court’s failure to even consider the
political question doctrine in its 2000 decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)); Ferejohn
& Kramer, supra note 35, at 191 (noting that the Supreme Court has “steer[ed] an erratic and
inconsistent course in how it has used and explained the political question doctrine over
time”).
66. See, e.g., supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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These categories are narrow to be sure, but what is important is
what they show: the Court’s explicit recognition that some constitu-
tional conflicts are too politically charged to be decided by anyone
other than politically accountable actors.67 
Other justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, mootness, the
federal question requirement, and the like—also illustrate the point,
providing ample opportunity for the Supreme Court to steer clear of
deciding politically hazardous cases. Indeed, the history of these
doctrines suggests that this was their purpose from the start.68
These are what Alexander Bickel famously referred to as “the pas-
sive virtues,”69 and the Court has invoked them on a number of
occasions to take itself out of constitutional decision-making fraught
with sensitivity to judicial intervention.70 As Neal Devins and Louis
Fisher explain, “This deliberate withholding of judicial power re-
flects the fact that courts lack ballot box legitimacy and need to
avoid costly collisions with the general public and other branches
of government.”71 What the justiciability doctrines reflect is the
recognition of a simple truth: sometimes the best the Supreme
Court can do in a constitutional controversy is to stay out of it.
67. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 184 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (describing the political question doctrine as
reflecting “the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally
irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from”).
68. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 35, at 184-93 (discussing the history of various
justiciability doctrines and noting that “[w]hat they share in common is the aim and effect of
curbing judicial responsibility in potentially sensitive areas of law and policy”); see also id. at
167 (“Federal judges have concocted an impressive body of doctrinal limitations, creating a
buffer zone that minimizes their chances of stepping heedlessly into political thickets.”).
69. See generally Bickel, supra note 61 (defending prudential use of justiciability doctrines
to avoid deciding cases that are politically volatile and may cause the Supreme Court to
sacrifice principle if decided on the merits); see also BICKEL, supra note 67, at 111-98 (chapter
discussion of “the passive virtues”).
70. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 310 (“On many occasions the Court has in-
voked the so-called passive virtues: procedural and jurisdictional mechanisms that allow the
Court to steer clear of politically explosive issues.”). A prominent example of this is Naim v.
Naim, an appeal that challenged Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in 1955 and was dismissed
by the Supreme Court for failing to present a federal question in the proper manner. See 350
U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); see also MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 117-
18 (2003) (discussing Naim v. Naim as a paradigmatic example of the Supreme Court
invoking Bickel’s “passive virtues” to avoid deciding a case that came to the Court through the
appeal, rather than certiorari, process).
71. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 311.
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Taken together, the doctrines I have discussed paint a radically
different picture of Supreme Court decision-making than what one
typically sees in judicial supremacy debates. On the surface, the
Court is supreme. But the way it uses that supremacy is nothing
like the conventional script. The Court defers to the will of the peo-
ple, adopts the will of the people, and even bows out to the will of
the people. And when it comes to constitutional decision-making,
the role of the people and their representatives is not done yet. 
C. Constitutional Dialogue with the Representative Branches
Both avenues of influence that I have discussed thus far—the
judicial appointments process and constitutional doctrine—involve
the representative branches. The representative branches decide
who to appoint, what laws to pass, and how to resolve nonjusticiable
disputes. But sometimes—indeed, many times—the executive and
legislative branches express their constitutional views in even more
direct ways. Consider the role of the Solicitor General in Supreme
Court litigation and congressional legislation that reflects a par-
ticular constitutional understanding.
1. The Solicitor General
The Solicitor General is the nation’s most successful litigator
before the Supreme Court, wielding tremendous influence on the
Court’s constitutional decision-making.72 The Supreme Court grants
a whopping 70 percent of the Solicitor General’s certiorari re-
quests—as opposed to 5 percent generally, and 21 percent for the
specialty Supreme Court bar73—and it rules in favor of the Solicitor
General’s position on the merits around 60 to 70 percent of the
72. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010) (“The U.S.
Solicitor General, as the U.S. Supreme Court’s premier advocate, has long exerted significant
influence over both the Court’s case selection decisions and its substantive decisions on the
merits.”); id. at 1333-35 (discussing the Solicitor General’s success rate at the petition and
merits stages compared to other litigants).
73. See John Shiffman et al., Elite Law Firms Spin Gold from a Rarified Niche: Getting
Cases Before the Supreme Court, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/scotus/ [https://perma.cc/67VH-KX7T].
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time.74 When the Solicitor General enters a case as amicus, as
opposed to as a party, its success rate is even higher—70 to 80
percent.75 Surveying the data, Brianne Gorod has it right: “It may
be the ‘province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is,’ but the Executive Branch often plays a significant role in
helping the judiciary make that determination.”76 
Granted, the Solicitor General’s positions are not a perfect proxy
for those of the executive branch. In theory, the Solicitor General
represents the United States, not the President, and in practice the
Solicitor General enjoys a substantial amount of independence in
determining what positions to take.77 That said, the Solicitor Gen-
eral is appointed by the President and serves at the President’s
pleasure78—and just as one might expect, empirical evidence has
shown that the positions that the Solicitor General takes tend to
reflect the ideological commitments of the administration in which
he or she serves.79 This is particularly true when it comes to highly
74. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 72, at 1335. When the Solicitor General is
petitioner, its success rate is 70 to 80 percent, as opposed to other petitioners, who win around
60 percent of the time. See id. at 1334. When the Solicitor General is respondent, its success
rate is 50 to 60 percent, as opposed to other respondents, who win around 40 percent of the
time. See id. at 1335. 
75. This figure holds true regardless of whether the Solicitor General is supporting the
petitioner or respondent. See id. at 1335.
76. Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1212 (2012) (footnote omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012) (“The Solicitor General ... may be sent ... to any State or
district in the United States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending
in a court of the United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States.”); id. § 518 (“[T]he Solicitor General shall conduct and argue suits and appeals
in the Supreme Court ... in which the United States is interested.”); Cordray & Cordray, supra
note 72, at 1365 (noting the Solicitor General’s “significant functional autonomy”); Kristen A.
Norman-Major, The Solicitor General: Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV.
1081, 1084-87 (1994) (discussing the autonomy of the Solicitor General and the relationship
between the Solicitor General and the executive branch).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 505 (“The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”); Cordray & Cordray, supra note 72,
at 1363 (“The Solicitor General is appointed by the President, and serves at the President’s
pleasure in the same manner that the Attorney General does.”).
79. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 72, at 1330 (“[Solicitors General] are advocates for
the policies and priorities of the administrations in which they serve, and ideology thus
inevitably plays a role as they set the government’s litigation agenda, select cases, and frame
arguments.”); id. at 1333 (noting empirical evidence demonstrating a “pattern of amicus
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publicized cases that implicate the President’s social policy agenda,
although the pressure on the Solicitor General to toe the party line
in such cases is more intense in some presidential administrations
than others.80
Of course, the executive branch has other ways to express its
views about the meaning of the Constitution as well. Presidential
signing statements, executive orders, and vetoes are a few that come
to mind.81 But it is difficult to match the influence of the Solicitor
General on the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making, and
so, to the extent that departmentalism is (as some have claimed)
mainly about the executive branch wanting to exert its influence on
the development of constitutional law,82 one response is to point out
the tremendous extent to which it already does.
filings under different administrations: solicitors general in Democratic administrations have
submitted substantially more amicus briefs in civil rights cases (and have primarily advocated
pro-rights positions), whereas solicitors general in Republican administrations have sub-
mitted substantially more amicus briefs in criminal cases (and have generally advocated
tighter restrictions on defendants’ rights)”); Norman-Major, supra note 77, at 1085-86
(“Studies show that in some ways the Solicitor General has responded to the political
inclinations of the administration(s) under which he served.... The political influence on the
Solicitor General by the President or Attorney General need not be overt to be effective.”
(footnote omitted)).
80. The Reagan Administration’s politicization of the Solicitor General to pursue its social
policy agenda is a well-known, and well-documented, example of this phenomenon. See
Norman-Major, supra note 77, at 1099-101 (discussing Solicitor General Rex Lee’s resignation
from his post in response to intense pressure from the Reagan Administration to pursue
conservative policies); see also id. at 1086 (“The fact is that the Solicitor General is a political
position, although the extent to which the work is politicized is largely controlled by the
administration under which the Solicitor General serves. Political pressure on the Solicitor
General can be direct, as in the Pentagon Papers and Bakke cases, or discreet.” (footnote
omitted)).
81. Devins and Fisher write:
When the President concludes that an act of Congress is unconstitutional, the
last word on that dispute typically rests with the executive .... President George
H. W. Bush helped maintain strict abortion funding restrictions by successfully
vetoing five bills that allowed some federal funding of abortion....
...[T]he President sometimes signals constitutional objections to legislation
through signing statements. When Bush I signed flag protection legislation in
1989, he expressed “serious doubts that it can withstand Supreme Court
review.”
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 55-56 (emphasis added) (quoting George H.W. Bush,
Statement on the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1403, 1403 (Oct. 26, 1989)).
82. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 16-17 (discussing why departmentalist claims are
predominantly claims of independent interpretive authority by the President).
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2. Congressional Legislation
Sometimes Congress has its own advocate in cases before the
Supreme Court, but this does not happen often, and when it does,
it is usually because the executive and legislative branches are
divided.83 More often, Congress communicates its constitutional
views by passing legislation that reflects a particular constitutional
understanding. As others have recognized, congressional legislation
of this sort serves a legitimating function, validating contested
constitutional understandings by transmitting them into the formal
law.84 Here again, the impact on the Court’s constitutional decision-
making is substantial.
Consider, for example, the role of congressional legislation in the
Supreme Court’s modern understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause. As Reva Siegel and Robert Post have persuasively shown,
the Court’s changed understanding of equal protection in the 1970s
did not just fall from the sky like manna from heaven; it was the
constitutional codification of a changed understanding of what the
dictates of equality required, an understanding that had found
83. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 916 (2012) (“Although
not unprecedented, it is ... unusual for either chamber of the U.S. Congress to join in
litigation.”); id. at 917 (“The executive is least likely to represent Congress’s interests during
periods of divided government.... Particularly during such periods, Congress cannot rely on
the president’s lawyers to represent its interests in court.”). The litigation in United States
v. Windsor is a prime example of this phenomenon. See Reply Brief on the Merits for
Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives, at i, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (“The
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives intervened
as a defendant in the district court and was an appellant and appellee in the court of
appeals.”).
84. See, e.g., Theodore Ruger, Social Movements Everywhere, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 18, 23 (2006) (“Justices are more likely to adopt a transformative new idea that
has been legitimated by transmission into concrete ‘law,’ not necessarily by a clear majority
of the entire American public, but at least by some parts of the American polity.”). 
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expression in a slew of federal statutes passed in the prior decade.85
Siegel and Post explain:
Congress responded to the [women’s movement] with the
legislative enactment of the [Equal Rights Amendment], Section
5 legislation, and a variety of other statutes. It was only after
Congress used its lawmaking powers to validate the movement’s
understanding of equality that the Court proved willing to mod-
ify its own Section 1 doctrine to protect citizens against state
action that discriminates on the basis of sex. The Court altered
its jurisprudence to reflect the evolving constitutional culture of
the country, as that culture was evidenced by congressional
lawmaking.86
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the point in its
1973 decision of Frontiero v. Richardson, explaining that “Congress
itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are in-
herently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of
Government is not without significance to the question presently
under consideration.”87 The country had come to understand its
commitment to equality in a new way, and congressional legislation
reflecting that fact provided strong support for the Court to incor-
porate this new understanding into the content of constitutional
law.
What about the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), inquiring minds
want to know; how does the above account explain the Supreme
85. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943,
1995-96 (2003) (discussing statutes); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323,
1368 n.115 (2006) (“In a decade the [women’s] movement sought enactment of the Equal Pay
Act and the sex discrimination provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and then during the
92nd Congress when the Equal Rights Amendment was enacted, the movement secured
enactment of a vast array of civil rights statutes, covering education, employment, childcare,
and more.”).
86. Post & Siegel, supra note 85, at 1951.
87. 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a benefit program for
families of military service members that provided automatic benefits to married servicemen
but required servicewomen to show that their husbands were dependent); accord City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“It is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be
embodied in legislation. When that occurs, courts should look to the fact of such change as a
source of guidance on evolving principles of equality.”).
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Court’s invalidation of DOMA?88 The answer, I submit, is that
DOMA did not reflect “the evolving constitutional culture of the
country,” to borrow again from Siegel and Post.89 To the contrary,
DOMA was designed to suppress it.90 In the context of the current
discussion, the lesson of DOMA is clear—congressional expressions
of constitutional meaning will have more weight as indicators of the
country’s understanding of its constitutional commitments to the
extent that they actually are.
Nearly three decades ago, Louis Fisher observed that “[i]n our
political system the executive and legislative branches necessarily
share with the judiciary a major role in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.”91 The world he was describing—the one that still exists—is
the world of soft supremacy. It should come as no surprise that the
people have their say in the interpretive process through the rep-
resentative branches; ours is a representative democracy. What is
more remarkable yet is that the so-called “constitutional dia-
logues”92 that the Supreme Court has with the representative
branches are but a part of a larger constitutional dialogue that the
Court has with the people themselves.
D. Constitutional Dialogue with the People Themselves
Perhaps the most powerful way in which the people have their
say in constitutional decision-making is the one that is least
structured and most difficult to define: the ongoing dialogue
between the Supreme Court and the people themselves. As Alexan-
der Bickel recognized in 1962, the Supreme Court engages in a
“continuing colloquy with the political institutions and with society
88. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013) (invalidating section 2 of
DOMA, which restricted the definition of marriage to unions between a man and woman). 
89. Post & Seigel, supra note 85, at 1951.
90. For an excellent discussion of the country’s evolving understanding of its
constitutional commitment to equality in the gay rights context, see generally MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE (2013).
91. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS
231 (1988). For other important statements of this interbranch dialogue, see, for example,
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Forward: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1994); Robert Nagel, The Role of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 382 (1988).
92. See FISHER, supra note 91, at 275-76.
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at large,” a dialogue in which constitutional meaning “evolve[s] con-
versationally,” rather than through unilateral declarations.93 In
short, the depiction of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-
making as separate, apart, and even at odds with the will of the
people is an inaccurate portrayal of how that decision-making
actually works. As political scientists have recognized, the Supreme
Court’s “institutional insularity” belies a fascinating relationship
between the Court and the American people—one that shows the
Supreme Court responding to, and reflecting, the nation’s constitu-
tional views, even in the absence of a formal mechanism for doing
so.94
Americans take a decidedly “protestant” approach to constitution-
al interpretation, assuming the legitimacy of individuals expressing
their constitutional views.95 As a result, our political discourse is
chock-full of ordinary citizens making claims about the meaning of
the Constitution.96 From gun control to abortion, and from affirma-
tive action and healthcare to the death penalty and LGBT rights,
Americans have an opinion on what the Constitution says and
93. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 240, 244. For other key contributions on judicial review as
a dialogue between the Supreme Court and the people, see DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18,
at 4; FISHER, supra note 91, at 5; Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 577, 581 (1993).
94. See Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited:
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POLITICS 1018,
1019-20 (2004).
95. See Jack M. Balkin, Protestant Constitutionalism: A Series of Footnotes to Sanford
Levinson, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 17, 2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/09/protestant-
constitutionalism-series-of.html [https://perma.cc/Y7Y4-D82W] (“One of Sandy [Levinson’s]
most fruitful ideas is constitutional protestantism, the idea that each citizen has the right to
decide for him or herself what the Constitution means.... Constitutional catholicism stands
for the view that a certain group of professional or learned authorities has the last word on
interpretation, while protestantism, as we have seen, invites all believers to offer their views
on the meaning of scripture. Sandy gives both positions their due, but he is essentially a
constitutional protestant.”). For the seminal work on this concept, see generally SANFORD
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
96. See Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections
and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 781 (2002) (“[P]rivate citizens offer their own inter-
pretations of the Constitution all of the time. Some academics make a living at it. Private
interpreters at the bar and in the press rush into constitutional battles before the Court and
evaluate and criticize the Court after it has rendered its opinion.”); see also Reva B. Siegel,
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 297, 322-23 (2001) (“Ordinary citizens believe that they are entitled to make claims
about the meaning of the Constitution” and that they view it as “having meaning that can be
ascertained apart from the pronouncements of those authorized to interpret it.”).
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means, and they are not shy about sharing it.97 All day, every day—
just read the paper, browse the Internet, watch the news. To borrow
from Barry Friedman, “it is impossible to ... miss the fact that we
live in a constitutional democracy, that the terms of our Consti-
tution are constantly being debated and discussed.”98 People of all
political persuasions make claims about the meaning of the
Constitution, and those claims vie for influence among the larger
body politic.99 This is just the sort of constitutional contestation one
would expect from a polity that views its voice as important in
determining what the Constitution means.100
What happens next depends on the course of history, but my focus
is on what happens when the public discourse leads to momentum
in favor of a particular constitutional understanding and the emer-
gence of a dominant view. Sometimes, but not always, the dominant
view is part and parcel of a larger social movement.101 And some-
times, but not always, the dominant view finds expression in state
or federal legislation as well.102 What matters is that as this
97. For an illustration of the point, consider the decal on a truck I happened to see on the
day I wrote this paragraph. See The Second Amendment Is My Gun Permit, http://law2.
richmond.edu/images/faculty/lain/IMG_0329.jpg [https://perma.cc/6RHV-XW4D].
98. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 385 (2009).
99. See Post & Siegel, supra note 85, at 1981-82 (“Constitutional issues frequently involve
questions of profound political moment and controversy.... [E]lected officials and ordinary
citizens, as well as judges and courtroom lawyers, regularly make claims about constitutional
law.”).
100. See id. at 1982 (“While Americans revere the Court and respect its authority to
pronounce constitutional law, they also expect their own constitutional beliefs to matter, and
will, in extraordinary circumstances, mobilize to secure recognition of their views.”); id. at
2029 (“Precisely because the Constitution has political as well as legal dimensions, we expect
it to be a site of contestation and disagreement.”). 
101. For excellent discussions of this phenomenon, see, for example, Jack M. Balkin, How
Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New
Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28-30 (2005); Post & Siegel, supra note 85, at 1950-51;
Siegel, supra note 85, at 1329-31; Siegel, supra note 96, at 299-300, 345. For a qualification
of the point, see Larry Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439,
1449 (2006) (“By no means do I wish to suggest that social movements are unimportant. But
neither is it clear just how big a role they play in actually changing people’s minds, for they
are themselves a product of the zeitgeist.”).
102. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing state legislative consensus); supra Part I.C.2
(discussing congressional legislation). Note that this is not the story of the Supreme Court’s
school desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
nor is it the story of the Court’s recognition of the right to gay marriage in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). In neither of these cases did the Court’s ruling have state or
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happens—as the many voices in our public discourse converge into
the voice of dominant public opinion, and as that voice becomes
increasingly loud and clear—we can start to see the Supreme Court
respond.
Empirical research confirms this phenomenon, showing time and
again the Supreme Court’s responsiveness to changes in dominant
public opinion even in the absence of changes in the Court’s
composition.103 Indeed, recent work has found that the influence of
public opinion is “far greater than previously documented,” leading
one team of researchers to conclude that “a system of popular
representation is alive and well in the Supreme Court.”104 None of
this is news to the Justices, who on numerous occasions have
recognized the influence of public opinion on their constitutional
decision-making.105 When the people coalesce around a particular
federal legislation on its side.
103. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 94, at 1019, 1033 (summarizing empirical results as
showing “a substantial degree of sensitivity to public opinion, even when the ideological
composition of the Court is held constant”); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The
Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on
Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 96-97 (1993) (“[T]he evidence suggests
that public opinion exercises important influence on the decisions of the Court even in the
absence of changes in the composition of the Court or in the partisan and ideological make up
of Congress and the presidency.... Our analyses indicate that for most of the period since 1956,
the Court has been highly responsive to majority opinion.”); see also Lee Epstein & Andrew
D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not
Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 279 (2010) (“What is surprising is that even after
taking into account ideology, Public Mood continues to be a statistically significant and
seemingly non-trivial predictor of outcomes.”). 
104. McGuire & Stimson, supra note 94, at 1033.
105. See, e.g., DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 40 (quoting Justice Jackson as saying,
“[l]et us not deceive ourselves; long-sustained public opinion does influence the process of
constitutional interpretation” (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Maintaining Our Freedoms: The
Role of the Judiciary (Aug. 24, 1953), in 19 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 759, 761 (1953)));
FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 384 (quoting Justice Ginsburg as stating that the Justices “do
not alone shape legal doctrine,” but rather “they participate in a dialogue with other organs
of government, and with the people as well” (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992))); JEFF YATES, POPULAR JUSTICE:
PRESIDENTIAL PRESTIGE AND EXECUTIVE SUCCESS IN THE SUPREME COURT 12 (2002) (quoting
Justice Frankfurter as explaining that, in large part, the Court’s decisions reflect “that
impalpable but controlling thing, the general drift of public opinion” (quoting CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 1155 (Michael Nelson ed., 1989))); William H.
Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986)
(“Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape being
influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at other jobs.”); see also
id. at 768-69 (“[I]f a judge on coming to the bench were to decide to seal himself off
1640 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1609
constitutional understanding, the Supreme Court tends to ratify
that view. As Mike Klarman notes, “That is simply how constitu-
tional law works.”106 
One might understand the Supreme Court’s responsiveness to
dominant public opinion in its constitutional decision-making in a
number of ways. Maybe it reflects nothing more than the fact that
the Justices are a part of society and thus are likely to take the view
that most members of society do.107 Maybe it reflects some sense
that the majority view is the constitutionally correct one too.108
Maybe it reflects the Justices’ natural inclination toward rulings
that will earn them acclaim, either now or in the future.109 Or maybe
it reflects the Justices’ awareness of, and strategic response to, what
happens when they ignore the people’s widely held constitutional
views.110 Whatever the reason, what matters is this: the Supreme
Court has its own relationship with the American people, a direct
dial that allows the Court to respond to, and reflect, the nation’s
constitutional views even without a formal mechanism for doing so.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand the evolution of constitutional
law over time—at least when it comes to the highly salient cases,
hermetically from all manifestations of public opinion, he would accomplish very little; he
would not be influenced by current public opinion, but instead would be influenced by the
state of public opinion at the time he came to the bench.”).
106. KLARMAN, supra note 90, at 207.
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality,
and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 53 (“Judges do not interpret the Constitution to please
majorities. But widespread social convictions are likely to influence anyone who lives in
society. Judges live in society.”); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 168 (1921) (“The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn
aside in their course, and pass the judges by.”).
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Comment: Second Amendment
Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 265 (2008) (noting that “at least in
some domains, widespread social convictions convey information about the proper content of
rights”); Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practice of Judicial
Review, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 679, 684-85 (1986) (“For if the Court is engaged in
the explication of values, it makes very good sense to refer to and be guided by the value
judgments of other societal decision makers.”).
109. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 374-75 (“The justices are no less vain than the
rest of us, and it is human nature to like to be liked or even applauded and admired.... Some
justices appear to play to immediate public opinion.”); see also KLARMAN, supra note 90, at
206-07 (discussing the Justices’ attentiveness to their legacy and predicting that the Supreme
Court will eventually recognize a constitutional right to gay marriage, noting, “What justice
would not be tempted to author the opinion that within a few short years likely would become
known as the Brown v. Board of the gay rights movement?”).
110. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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the ones that the people care most about—in any other way.
“[S]ocial understandings of law shape legal understandings,” Larry
Kramer explains.111 As societal norms evolve, constitutional
commands like due process and equal protection (and other,
seemingly less capacious ones as well) take on new meaning.112 “The
obvious becomes dubious, the dubious obvious,” writes Lawrence
Friedman.113 This is why what was so evidently right in 1896 when
the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson114 was so evidently wrong in
1954 when the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.115 And
this is why the people’s views are—again, borrowing from Kramer—
“more than a source of ideas for the Supreme Court to consider as
it goes about making law for the rest of us.”116 The people are an
integral part of the interpretive process, the key to understanding
how the evolution of constitutional law actually works.
None of this is to say that the Supreme Court always reflects the
country’s views. Most cases fly so far below the radar that it would
be impossible to make that sort of claim; the American people do not
know about the vast majority of cases and likely would not have an
111. Kramer, supra note 32, at 983. 
112. Even decisions like District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), holding that
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms and decided on originalist
grounds, make most sense when understood in this manner. As Cass Sunstein observes: 
Notwithstanding the Court’s preoccupation with constitutional text and history,
Heller cannot be adequately understood as an effort to channel the document’s
original public meaning. The Court may have been wrong on that issue, and
even if it was right, a further question remains: why was the robust individual
right to possess guns recognized in 2008, rather than 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988, or
1998?...
...This point has general implications for constitutional change in the United
States, even when the Court contends, in good faith, that it is merely channeling
the original meaning or other established sources of constitutional meaning.
Sunstein, supra note 108, at 247-48. 
113. Friedman, supra note 18, at 154; see also id. at 153 (“Legal arguments that were
persuasive in the past seem ridiculous today; arguments made today are taken seriously that
would have been laughed off the boards in the past, or rejected in shock.”).
114. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding “separate but equal” racial classifications),
overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a discussion of how cultural context can
constrain the Supreme Court’s inclination and ability to recognize rights claims using Plessy
as one of three case studies of the phenomenon, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Three Supreme
Court “Failures” and a Story of Supreme Court Success, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1025-31
(2016).
115. 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954).
116. Kramer, supra note 32, at 983.
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opinion on them even if they did.117 Moreover, even in highly salient
cases, the Court sometimes goes its own way—although the number
of times it has done so is quite small,118 and even the Court’s most
famous cases in that regard were strikingly less countermajoritar-
ian than commonly supposed.119 As to those cases—and to preview
my claim in Part II—what we see is that the American people either
accept the Court’s decision, recognizing that the Constitution some-
times requires protecting an unpopular view, or they do not accept
the decision, and the law changes.120 But that point is yet to come;
my point here is simply to concede that the Supreme Court does not
always track the people’s views. Moreover, it is sometimes in the
business of starting conversations too.121
117. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 2623 (“[O]nly a small fraction of the Supreme Court’s
work is likely to be salient with the public, absent some other influence to hold the decisions
in the public light.”); Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 3, 9 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (“For the most part, the decisions of
the Supreme Court and other courts go unnoticed by the American public.... Most issues
courts deal with, whether they revolve around torts, antitrust, federal statutes, or even
important questions of constitutional law, are overly complex and/or below the radar of both
the mainstream media and public attention.”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 377 (“The
Court also has a better chance of going its own way in cases that are of low public salience.
The Court decides lots of cases, and only so many of them can make it to the public
consciousness. In others, the Court can fly under the radar, unnoticed.”). 
118. See Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1750 (2001) (“On only a relative handful of occasions has the Court
interpreted the Constitution in ways opposed by a clear majority of the nation.... The number
of times that an overwhelming majority of Americans has opposed the Court’s constitutional
interpretations probably can be counted on one hand.”).
119. Understanding these cases has been an interest of mine for a number of years. See
generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004) (historically
contextualizing the landmarks of the criminal procedure revolution) [hereinafter Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?]; Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (2007) (historically contextualizing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which
invalidated the death penalty as it then existed) [hereinafter Lain, Furman Fundamentals];
Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing Engel, 67
STAN. L. REV. 479 (2015) (historically contextualizing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962),
which invalidated school prayer) [hereinafter Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way].
120. See infra Part II.
121. See KLARMAN, supra note 90, at 165 (“Prominent Court decisions can direct public
attention to previously ignored issues. Americans were not preoccupied with flag burning
until the Supreme Court issued two controversial rulings on the subject in 1989 and 1990.”).
For a more recent example, consider Justice Kennedy’s separate concurrence in Davis v.
Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208-10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ayala was a capital case
challenging an all-white jury, and Kennedy wrote his concurrence solely to bring attention to
the exceedingly harsh conditions of solitary confinement on death row. See id. at 2208 (“This
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But none of these nuances change the basic truth: the Supreme
Court is by and large a responsive institution, and what it responds
to are the people’s views. As Justice O’Connor has observed, “[R]eal
change, when it comes, stems principally from attitudinal shifts in
the population at large. Rare indeed is the legal victory—in court or
legislature—that is not a careful by-product of an emerging social
consensus. Courts, in particular, are mainly reactive institutions.”122
My own sense is that this is true not because the Justices are
actually trying to decide cases consistent with dominant public
opinion (although their state-counting doctrine suggests that some-
times they are) but rather because of everything I have discussed
thus far. Because conscious or not, this is just what the Justices do.
Some say that the Supreme Court’s tendency to take on the
nation’s constitutional understandings as its own is a good thing
because (ironically, in light of the current discussion) it adds a de-
cidedly democratic component to the construction of constitutional
law,123 and because the Constitution is hard to formally amend.124
Others say this is a bad thing because it ignores the constraint of a
written Constitution,125 because the Court is institutionally
separate writing responds only to one factual circumstance, mentioned at oral argument but
with no direct bearing on the precise legal questions presented by this case.”).
122. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE 166 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). For other articulations of the point, see Michael C. Dorf,
The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 791, 807 (2002)
(“Before an argument or emotional appeal succeeds in changing the minds of lawmakers
(including judges), it must first change the minds of a mass of the public.”); Kramer, supra
note 32, at 980 (“[W]hat courts say is itself only the end product of a larger, societal process
of generating legal meaning.”).
123. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 325 (“By participating in this [interpretive]
process, the public has an opportunity to add legitimacy, vitality, and meaning to what might
otherwise be an alien and short-lived document.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Essay, Roe
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 383 (2007)
(“The democratic legitimacy of our constitutional law in part depends on its responsiveness
to popular opinion.”); Winter, supra note 108, at 685 (“One would not want it any other way
in a democracy.... Those at the top of the political organization may have the power to declare
and require adherence to societal norms—that is, to ‘the law.’ But the process requires
dialogue because the viability of those norms and the legitimacy of their enforcement depends
to a very large extent on the existence of a consensus—whether emerging or preexisting—
amongst society.”).
124. See Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional Change,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1239 (2010) (“Is this process of constitutional change a good
thing?... [I]t is awfully hard, in light of the difficulty of the Article V amendment process, to
see how it could be any different.”). 
125. But see supra note 112 (noting that even decisions justified on originalist grounds in
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incompetent to be tracking the majority view,126 and because it
means the Court is unlikely to play the heroic, countermajoritarian
role for which it is famous.127 But my interest is not an extended
discussion of whether the reality is good or bad; my interest is in
making sure that we understand the reality. Reva Siegel sums up
the point nicely: “A look at our constitutional history suggests that
judicial supremacy is, in important respects, a collaborative prac-
tice, involving the Court in partnerships with the representative
branches and the People themselves.”128 The constitutional history
she describes is the history of soft supremacy.
For those who oppose judicial supremacy in favor of democratic
rule, one more point merits mention: democratic rule supports the
practice of judicial supremacy. As a purely descriptive matter, the
public not only assumes judicial supremacy, but also endorses it,
preferring that the judiciary resolve constitutional disputes regard-
less of the substantive outcome.129 As Frank Michelman explains,
“what Americans want above all else out of the Supreme Court is
assurance that someone is there to bring the country to heel when
good faith may be best understood as reflecting larger social understandings, using District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as a prime example).
126. It is such a common critique that I feel duty-bound to mention it, although one would
think that the empirical evidence on this issue provides a sufficient answer. See supra note
14 and accompanying text (noting empirical evidence showing that the Supreme Court’s
decision-making is roughly as majoritarian as that of the representative branches). 
127. This is the so-called “majoritarian difficulty.” See Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian
Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 284-85
(2010) (“Are courts that roughly follow public opinion capable of ... protecting minority rights
against majoritarian excesses? Do American courts, in other words, have a ‘majoritarian
difficulty?’” (footnote omitted)). For my answer—which is yes—and an account of the Supreme
Court’s role in creating this heroic, countermajoritarian image in the first place, see Lain,
supra note 114, at 1067-74.
128. Siegel, supra note 96, at 351.
129. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 232 (“In several recent surveys, more than 60 percent
of respondents answered that the Supreme Court has the ‘last say’ on constitutional
questions.”); James L. Gibson, Public Images and Understandings of Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 828, 840-41 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer
eds., 2010) (discussing the results of six surveys conducted between 1987 and 2008 indicating
diffuse support for the Supreme Court); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000
Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (2001) (“[A]s a descriptive matter,
judges, lawyers, politicians, and the general public today accept the principle of judicial
supremacy—indeed, they assume it as a matter of course.”); Kevin L. Yingling, Note, Justi-
fying the Judiciary: A Majoritarian Response to the Countermajoritarian Problem, 15 J.L. &
POL. 81, 94 (1999) (“Significant evidence indicates that people prefer that the courts decide
such constitutional disputes regardless of the substantive outcome.”).
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chaos looms or politics threaten to get out of hand.”130 When
craziness ensues, the people want to know there is a responsible
adult in the room. Of course, one might counter that the people
simply do not appreciate the dangers of judicial supremacy; they
know too little and are too busy living their lives to take the time to
understand.131 But as Dale Carpenter notes, the idea that a bunch
of constitutional theorists would step in and decide the issue for
them is a mighty odd position to take for those who put all their
chips on the primacy of democratic rule.132 In the end, it is hard to
say that judicial supremacy takes the Constitution away from the
people when the people are quite content for the Supreme Court to
have it.
All of this is to say that the depiction of judicial supremacy as
being in deep tension with democratic self-governance is itself in
deep tension with reality. In theory the Supreme Court might be
insulated from the will of the people, but in reality the Court’s
constitutional decision-making is inextricably intertwined with the
will of the people, channeling the views of political and popular
majorities in a myriad of ways. To the extent, then, that opposition
to judicial supremacy is driven by a desire to give power to the
people in determining what the Constitution says, my answer is
that they already have it, in spades. Critics are getting what they
want, just not in the way they want. The nub of the problem is that
if the people are unhappy, they cannot just “vote the bastards
out.”133 What control do the people have if the Supreme Court goes
astray?, critics ask. To that question the discussion turns next.
130. Frank I. Michelman, Machiavelli in Robes? The Court in the Election, in THE LONGEST
NIGHT: POLEMICS AND PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTION 2000, at 256, 266 (Arthur J. Jacobson &
Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2002).
131. See Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT.
405, 412 (2003) (“Perhaps the people are too uninformed about the danger. Perhaps the issues
are just too complicated for them to understand. Perhaps they are preoccupied by other issues,
prosaic ones, they regard as more central to their lives. If so, constitutional theorists may
have to save their Constitution for them.”).
132. See id. (“[T]his would be an uncomfortably elitist response from commentators who
celebrate self-government.”). 
133. It is a saying. For illustrations of the expression, see AMMOLAND, http://www.
ammoland.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Vote-the-Bastards-Out-600x375.jpg [https://
perma.cc/YGM6-Y9SC]; KEEP-CALM-O-MATIC, http://www.keepcalm-o-matic.co.uk/p/keep-
calm-and-vote-the-bastards-out-4/ [https://perma.cc/B7EE-UGRX].
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II. “WE THE PEOPLE” AFTER CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING
Critics claim that the problem with judicial supremacy is that it
gives the Supreme Court the last word on constitutional controver-
sies—that is what judicial supremacy is, and that is how the
usurpation of the people’s right to self-governance occurs.134 The
Court decides the issue, and it gets the last word. In the discussion
below, I challenge this formalistic conception, using the reality of
judicial supremacy to show that the Supreme Court’s pronounce-
ments are final in only the thinnest of ways. Granted, the Supreme
Court has the final say in the case it is deciding. But the fight over
judicial supremacy is about whether the Court’s ruling settles the
matter for future constitutional claims,135 and the answer to that
question ultimately depends on the people themselves. As it turns
out, the people and their representatives have a number of ways to
control the staying power of a Supreme Court decision—some
directed at the decision, others directed at the Supreme Court itself. 
A. The Judicial Appointments Process
I start with the judicial appointments process because it so clearly
illustrates an important point: the front side of one decision is often
just the back side of another, and so the people’s influence on
constitutional decision-making yet to happen may take the form of
their reaction to constitutional decision-making that has already
occurred. What do the people and their representatives do when
they fundamentally disagree with the Supreme Court’s understand-
ing of the Constitution? They appoint Justices to the bench who also
fundamentally disagree with it. Warren Burger, for example, was
almost certainly appointed for his outspoken criticism of Miranda
134. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (presenting the critique of judicial
supremacy on democratic grounds).
135. See Whittington, supra note 96, at 797-98 (“The judiciary does, of course, resolve
individual cases, but that limited settlement function of the courts is not in dispute.... The
question is how effectively the courts can broadly settle contested matters of constitutional
interpretation.”); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Importance of Being Final, 20 CONST.
COMMENT. 359, 364 (2003) (“[W]ith the single prominent exception of Michael Paulsen, no one
seriously argues against decisional supremacy.”).
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v. Arizona,136 the chief target of Richard Nixon’s 1968 “law and
order” campaign.137 And Antonin Scalia, as Jack Balkin notes, may
have complained bitterly about popular mobilization on the abortion
issue to change the Court’s constitutional views, but his place on the
bench was in large part a function of that mobilization, and the
electoral votes that followed, and the appointment power that
followed that.138
Granted, it takes time for the appointments process to work
constitutional change—time to appoint the Justices hostile to a
particular decision, and time for them to decide cases that limit the
decision so that it no longer much matters and is ripe to be over-
ruled. And granted, all the provisos previously discussed regarding
the ability of the appointments process to accurately channel the
will of the people apply here too. But the basic point remains: the
people and their representatives control the Supreme Court’s
composition, so the Court’s constitutional rulings can withstand the
people’s determined opposition for only so long.139 Over time, the
people will have their way with the meaning of the Constitution.
136. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
137. See YALOF, supra note 30, at 101 (discussing Warren Burger’s nomination and noting
that “[e]ven more important [to Nixon], Burger had cultivated a reputation as an outspoken
critic of the Warren Court’s decisions favoring the accused, including the controversial 1966
Miranda decision”). 
138. See Balkin, supra note 101, at 28 (“Justice Scalia may well dismiss the claims of the
abortion protesters outside his window, but he sits on the Supreme Court in large part
because of the success of the conservative social movements of the 1970’s and 1980’s which
helped put the Republican Party in power.”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (“We are offended by these marchers who descend upon us, every year on the
anniversary of Roe, to protest our saying that the Constitution requires what our society has
never thought the Constitution requires.... How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens
(good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on various sides of
other issues as well) think that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as
though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind
of social consensus.”).
139. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1030-31 (2004) (“Because Article III lodges the
composition of the federal judiciary in the political control of the President and the Senate,
no judicial interpretation of the Constitution can withstand the mobilized, enduring, and
determined opposition of the people.... In view of these features of our constitutional order,
it is unhelpful to define judicial supremacy as giving to courts the last word or ultimate
authority to determine constitutional meaning.”).
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Article III guarantees it,140 and in the meantime there are other
controls that the people and their representatives can use.
B. Constitutional Amendment
Any discussion of how the people and their representatives
control the finality of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions
must at least mention the constitutional amendment process. After
all, Article V provides a structural mechanism for the people to
override the Court’s pronouncements of what the Constitution
means, if only by amending the Constitution to change the meaning
that the Court has given it.141 But I will not be spending much time
on this particular control mechanism, as the formal amendment
process is exceedingly difficult and rarely used. Indeed, it has been
successfully deployed to overturn a Supreme Court ruling only four
times in our constitutional history.142 
That said, it merits mention that the formal amendment process
need not be successful in order to successfully change the Supreme
Court’s constitutional views. The failed Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) is a prime example. As David Strauss observes, “Today, it is
difficult to identify any respect in which constitutional law is dif-
ferent from what it would have been if the ERA had been adopted.
For the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has acted as if the
Constitution contains a provision forbidding discrimination on the
basis of gender.”143 What explains the Supreme Court’s changed con-
stitutional understanding? As previously discussed, congressional
legislation is part of the story,144 but just as important, if not more
so, was the ERA. The ERA mattered, Reva Siegel explains, because
congressional expressions of constitutional understanding matter,
140. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III.
141. See id. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified.”).
142. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 25-27 (discussing the difficulty of amending
the Constitution and the few occasions when the amendment process was successful in
overturning a Supreme Court decision).
143. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1476-77 (2001) (footnote omitted).
144. See supra Part I.C.2.
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and Congress’s landslide votes passing the ERA provided the Court
with a strong indication of the nation’s widely held constitutional
views.145 In short, the ERA mattered not because it changed the text
of the Constitution, but because it helped change the Supreme
Court’s understanding of what the text required, even though the
amendment process failed. In the end, this sort of constitutional
change may be the most realistic way that the Article V process
actually works.
C. Court-Curbing Measures
Yet another way for the people and their representatives to con-
trol the finality of constitutional rulings is by adopting court-curbing
measures to control the Supreme Court. The Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to strip the Court of its jurisdiction, alter its size,
impeach its members, and control its budget, among other things.146
Here again, I pass by most all of these control mechanisms because
over the last half-century they have rarely been used.
Jurisdiction-stripping is a modest exception in that regard; it has
been an oft-cited threat over the years, and to the extent that court-
curbing measures are a realistic possibility, that possibility plays
out here. Article III gives Congress the power to make “exceptions”
to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, so Congress controls
the types of cases that the Court hears as a matter of constitutional
design.147 In theory, then, a hostile Congress could strip the Su-
preme Court of jurisdiction over a class of cases, leaving a pocket of
statutes that the Court would be powerless to consider in its ex-
ercise of judicial review.148 From 2003 through 2006, Congress
threatened to do exactly that, considering proposals to strip the
145. For a full account of the argument, see generally Siegel, supra note 85. The House of
Representatives passed the ERA in October 1971 by a vote of 354-24. See 117 CONG. REC.
35,815 (1971) (recording the House vote). The Senate passed the ERA in March 1972 by a vote
of 84-8. See 118 CONG. REC. 9598 (1972) (recording the Senate vote).
146. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 24-25 (discussing various court-curbing
techniques); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 35, at 171-75 (same).
147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.”).
148. See id.; see also Colo. Cent. Consol. Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138, 141 (1893) (“[I]t
has been held in an uninterrupted series of decisions that this court exercises appellate
jurisdiction only in accordance with the acts of Congress upon that subject.”).
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Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over cases involving same-sex
marriage, the pledge of allegiance, enemy combatants, and state-
sponsored acknowledgments of God, among others.149 Although
Congress did manage to pass limited jurisdiction-stripping meaures
in the enemy-combatant context,150 by and large, its consideration
of such proposals was more talk than action. Jurisdiction-stripping
may be the most commonly threatened court-curbing measure, but
it is still not one that the people actually use. 
It may be that Congress’s failure to follow through on threats
to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction reflects the serious
constitutional and pragmatic concerns that mark this particular
court-curbing measure.151 Or maybe it reflects the sheer difficulty
of passing any court-curbing measure in a world of divided gov-
ernment and strong public support for the Supreme Court.152 Or
maybe, as Neal Devins has argued, controlling the Supreme Court
was never the point of the 2003-2006 jurisdiction-stripping pro-
posals in the first place.153 As Devins explains, “it did not matter
149. See Neal Devins, Congress and Judicial Supremacy, in THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 45, 54-55 (Bruce Peabody ed., 2011) (discussing various jurisdiction-stripping
proposals and noting that “the specter of lawmakers expressing their disapproval of court
decision-making through retaliatory legislation seemed more real during 2005 and 2006 than
at any time since the Warren Court”).
150. Ultimately, the Court rebuffed Congress’s attempt to restrict the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction in this area, first in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and then in
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). But as Devins explains, neither case was parti-
cularly problematic vis-à-vis Congress because both jurisdiction-stripping measures at issue
were “the exceptions that prove[d] the rule—statutes that explicitly limit[ed] judicial review
but [did] so in ways that signal[ed] congressional support of judicial authority.” Devins, supra
note 149, at 61.
151. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 54
(1980) (noting that if Congress were to divest the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in
an area, then it would leave the final resolution of issues in that area with the various courts
of appeals, creating the potential for inconsistency without a way to resolve it and potentially
freezing into place the doctrine that inspired the jurisdiction-stripping measure in the first
instance); Mark A. Graber, supra note 6, at 1589 (“The precise power Congress holds over
federal jurisdiction has been the subject of a running constitutional debate for more than two
hundred years.”). 
152. See Lain, supra note 20, at 162 (“Divided government and political polarization make
it unlikely that the Court’s foes will unite behind a court-curbing agenda—assuming that
actually curbing the Court (as opposed to galvanizing the party base) is the point of such
proposals in the first place.” (footnote omitted)); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 98
(“Progressives responded to the Lochner Court by frequently proposing a variety of court-
curbing measures that were promptly buried in conservative congressional committees.”).
153. See Devins, supra note 149, at 64 (“The rhetorical attacks on the Court were addressed
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whether jurisdiction-stripping proposals were enacted, let alone
found constitutional.”154 What mattered was that Republicans re-
affirmed their commitment to the religious right, particularly with
strategists predicting that their success in upcoming elections might
turn on the propensity of religious conservatives to vote.155
Of course, the mere threat of jurisdiction-stripping or other retali-
atory court-curbing measures may be enough to make the Supreme
Court step back from constitutional rulings that the people find in-
tolerable. The so-called “switch-in-time that saved nine” is perhaps
history’s most famous example of this phenomenon,156 but it is not
the only one.157 Indeed, empirical evidence shows that court-curbing
efforts “have generally proven successful in forcing judicial accom-
modation to political pressure, even without the actual restriction
not to the Court but to social conservatives.”); id. at 60 (noting that “Republican leaders had
little to gain by pushing for the enactment of these bills” and surmising that this may explain
why several jurisdiction-stripping proposals never made it out of committee, whereas others
were voted on too late for consideration in the Senate, although the timing was opportune by
way of upcoming elections). 
154. Id. at 60.
155. See id. at 59-60 (discussing the use of jurisdiction-stripping measures to signal strong
commitment to a social conservative agenda and noting that “[a]t that time, Republican
strategists thought that President Bush’s reelection might hinge on the willingness of
religious conservatives to vote in the 2004 elections”).
156. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES, & POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 53 (5th ed. 2002) (“This ‘switch-in-time that saved nine’ is the most
dramatic American example of judicial retreat, but it is certainly not the only one.”). I concede
that some evidence suggests that Justice Owen Roberts may have changed his mind on the
constitutionality of Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation before the court-packing plan was an-
nounced, which complicates this narrative, although it remains perhaps the most famous
example of the point. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 419 (2002) (discussing the
relevant historical record).
157. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 194 n.169, 196-97 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
retreat from its “Red Monday” decisions protecting communists in 1957 when faced with the
threat of court-curbing measures and noting that its move “might be called a second ‘switch
in time’”). For a theory of constitutional change built on the Supreme Court’s submission to
threats of populist reprises on particularly momentous occasions, with special attention to the
“switch in time” that followed Roosevelt’s court-packing proposal, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 23-26 (1998) (discussing the “switch in time”).
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of judicial power.”158 In short, court-curbing proposals are largely
successful even when they fail. 
This brings me to one last point: it is entirely possible that the
reason we rarely see efforts to curb the Supreme Court is that we
rarely see the Court act in a way that would give such efforts much
traction. Political scientists have shown that the Justices respond
not only to threats of retaliation, but also to the anticipation of
threats of retaliation, adjusting their decision-making to the re-
sponse of the representative branches even before it occurs.159 To the
extent that this happens, the fact that court-curbing measures are
rarely used does not mean they are ineffective. To the contrary, it
suggests that just the opposite is true.
That said, my own sense is that the possibility of court-curbing
measures is not the response that the Justices worry most about, or
the control mechanism that most keeps them in line. Rather, it is
the possibility that the people will not abide by their decisions, and
the representative branches will not force them to do so. 
D. Nonenforcement
Supreme Court decisions are not self-executing. What the Court
has—indeed, all the Court has—is the power of “Because I said so.”
In the words of Alexander Hamilton, the judiciary has “neither
158. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 75; see also Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of
Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEM-
PORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 134 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2005)
(noting results of one empirical study showing that “[c]ourt-curbing bills, even when not
enacted, produced decisional reactions by the Court in six of the nine periods of ‘intense
Congressional hostility’” (quoting Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality
of Political Power, 54 REV. POLITICS 369, 369 (1992))).
159. See Lee Epstein et al., Essay, The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,
50 EMORY L.J. 583, 610 (2001) (“Tests at both the individual and the aggregate levels support
the proposition that the Justices adjust their decisions in anticipation of the potential
responses of the other branches of government.”); Friedman, supra note 124, at 1245 (“The
effect that political scientists call ‘anticipated reaction’ or ‘anticipated response’ means that
if the system is in equilibrium, little will be observed in the way of overt struggle. The
Justices know their bounds; they stay away from trouble.”); see also POSNER, supra note 20,
at 375 (“What reins in the Justices ... is an awareness, conscious or unconscious, that they
cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting reprisals by the other branches of government spurred on
by an indignant public.”).
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Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”160 This is the reason it is the
“least dangerous” branch161—even the mighty United States Su-
preme Court is largely powerless to effectuate change on its own.162
The Supreme Court needs the support of the executive or legislative
branches to make its rulings count, but those branches may choose
to override, undermine, or even ignore the Court’s rulings instead.
Indeed, the more the Court strays from the will of the people, the
more help it will need to enforce its decisions and the less help it can
expect to get.163 In short, yet another reason that the Supreme
Court’s constitutional decisions so often go the people’s way is the
difficulty of enforcing those decisions that do not.164
This is the lesson of Gerald Rosenberg’s classic, The Hollow
Hope,165 and it is amply illustrated by Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.166 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling, the South
turned to massive resistance,167 and the representative branches
160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). The
full text of the passage is instructive. It reads: “It may truly be said to have neither Force nor
Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.” Id.
161. Id.
162. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 420 (2d ed. 2008) (“The structural constraints ... built into the American judicial
system[ ] make courts virtually powerless to produce change. They must depend on the actions
of others for their decisions to be implemented.”).
163. See Lain, supra note 20, at 161 (“The more popular the ruling, the riskier it will be for
public officials to oppose or subvert it (at least openly); conversely, the more unpopular the
ruling, the more difficult it will be to enforce and the less likely that elected officials will
commit to enforcement.”); McGuire & Stimson, supra note 94, at 1022 (hypothesizing that the
Supreme Court’s responsiveness to public opinion is “a classic case of rational anticipation by
policy makers” and explaining that “[t]he Court requires the cooperation of legislative and
executive officials, many of whom are themselves careful auditors of mass opinion”); id. at
1019 (“[W]hile the Court is certainly not electorally accountable, those responsible for putting
its rulings into effect frequently are. For that reason, strategic justices must gauge the
prevailing winds that drive reelection-minded politicians and make decisions accordingly.”
(citation omitted)).
164. For a political science model of Supreme Court decision-making that explains this
phenomenon as a matter of “rational choice institutionalism”—strategic choices in light of the
Court’s forced dependency on other institutional actors—see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 11-17 (1998).
165. See ROSENBERG, supra note 162, at 16 (“If the separation of powers, and the placing
of the power to enforce court decisions in the executive branch, leaves courts practically
powerless to insure that their decisions are supported by elected and administrative officials,
then they are heavily dependent on popular support to implement their decisions.”).
166. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
167. See ROSENBERG, supra note 162, at 78-80 (discussing massive resistance and noting
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offered little by way of support.168 President Eisenhower steadfast-
ly refused to endorse the Court’s ruling and on several occasions
quietly declined federal enforcement.169 Meanwhile, Congress con-
sidered and rejected an enforcement provision for Brown in its 1957
Civil Rights Act.170 Ten years later, the ruling that the Supreme
Court had declared “the supreme law of the land”171 had changed
next to nothing. Just 1.2 percent of black children in the South
attended school with whites.172
Lest one think that Brown was an aberration in this regard, it is
worth pausing to consider the ability of the representative branches
to undermine enforcement of Supreme Court decisions more gen-
erally. Some say this is overstated—that enforcement is routinely
forthcoming if only because the executive would have to expend
tremendous political capital to refuse.173 But that misses the reality
that “[b]y 1957, only three years after Brown, at least 136 new laws and state constitutional
amendments designed to preserve segregation had been enacted.... As the Southern saying
went, ‘as long as we can legislate, we can segregate’” (quoting HARRELL R. RODGERS &
CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 72 (1972))).
168. This may seem puzzling given that Brown was itself a largely majoritarian ruling. For
a discussion of the many reasons why the Supreme Court may, on occasion, be more
majoritarian than the ostensibly majoritarian branches, with Brown as one example, see
generally Lain, supra note 20. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the phenomenon as one of
three implications of soft supremacy).
169. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 324-25 (2004) (“The [Eisenhower] administration[ ]
fail[ed] in 1956 to enforce desegregation orders against local resistance in Clinton, Tennessee;
Tuscaloosa, Alabama; and Mansfield and Texarkana, Texas.”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 131 (1994) (“After the Court
issued its ruling, Eisenhower repeatedly refused to publicly endorse it, observing that the
president’s role extended only to enforcing, not to approving or disapproving, Supreme Court
decisions.... Moreover, in 1956 Eisenhower on more than one occasion refused to involve the
federal government when mob protests and state obstructionism blocked the implementation
of school desegregation orders.”).
170. See KLARMAN, supra note 169, at 366 (noting that the 1957 Civil Rights Act originally
had an enforcement provision that would have allowed the Attorney General to sue for
injunctions to enforce Brown but that it was stricken in response to charges that it would
result in enforcement of Brown with “federal bayonets”).
171. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”).
172. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 671 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).
173. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 301 (1994) (“The moral force of persuasive, independent
judgment on matters of constitutional and statutory law by the least dangerous branch makes
it, politically, extremely difficult for the executive to act in a manner inconsistent with that
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of how the implementation process actually works. It is true that
Presidents rarely outright refuse to enforce a Supreme Court ruling,
but they can engage in a number of passive-aggressive responses
that result in “willfully lackluster” enforcement.174 As Alexander
Bickel put the point, “there are degrees of enthusiasm in rendering
executive support.”175 Consider the efforts of the executive branch
during the Reagan and both Bush Administrations to underenforce
and undermine Roe v. Wade.176 And consider the efforts of Congress
to underenforce Supreme Court rulings in the bussing context,
abortion context, and criminal procedure context by simply denying
the federal funding needed to enforce them.177 There are a multitude
of ways for the executive and legislative branches to wage a “lower-
level war of attrition” against Supreme Court rulings they do not
like—ways that are not easily challenged or even readily noticed.178
As Judge Richard Posner explains, the Supreme Court “cannot put
judgment.”).
174. Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 35, at 169. For a discussion of five passive-aggressive
responses to the duty to enforce, see generally Corinna Barrett Lain, Passive-Aggressive
Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 227 (2013).
175. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 252.
176. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 177-78 (“The Reagan—and later the George
H.W. Bush—administration invoked its regulatory authority to advance a pro-life agenda.
Policies on fetal tissue research, USAID grant recipients, the importation of the abortifacient
RU-486, and restrictions on abortions in military hospitals were all promulgated pursuant to
the executive’s authority to implement the laws.”); Gerhardt, supra note 4, at 780 (“Similarly,
Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush did not just underenforce
Roe v. Wade; they tried to undermine it. They used all their prerogatives, including issuing
executive orders withdrawing abortion services for military personnel, vetoing bills, sup-
porting bills withdrawing financial support for abortion services, and appointing anti-Roe
judges and Justices, to implement their judgment that Roe was a mistake.”).
177. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 156, at 318 (discussing Congress’s attempt to prevent
implementation of Supreme Court rulings in the bussing context by adding a provision to its
1980 appropriations bill that forbid the Department of Justice from spending money to enforce
them); POSNER, supra note 20, at 156 (“And without directly challenging the courts Congress
often can use its legislative authority to pull the sting of constitutional rulings that it does not
like, as by defunding abortion clinics, [and] starving legal aid clinics and criminal defenders
of funds.”).
178. Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the
Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533, 536 (2006)
(“Many of the other weapons possessed by Congress are quite blunt, and their use can attract
public attention and debate. But Congress can wage a lower-level war of attrition with regard
to some constitutional decisions simply by failing to take heed of them.”); Scott E. Lemieux
& David J. Watkins, Beyond the “Countermajoritarian Difficulty”: Lessons from Contemporary
Democratic Theory, 41 POLITY 30, 35 (2009) (“Governments can use a wide array of passive
and active strategies to resist implementation in ways that leave the courts little recourse.”).
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its hands on most of the levers of governmental power, [so] Congress
or the President, without visibly retaliating, is often able to pull the
sting from a constitutional decision.”179 In short, resistance need not
be explicit; indeed, it may be more effective when it is not.
Granted, in one class of cases—criminal prosecutions—the
Supreme Court can largely rely on lower courts and the power of
stare decisis to enforce its constitutional commands. As Matt Hall
notes in his study of the impact of Supreme Court rulings, “the
Court may not hold the sword or the purse of our society, but it does
hold the keys to our jail.”180 Yet even here, the efficacy of the Court’s
rulings—particularly when they are unpopular—is far from guar-
anteed. Lower courts have substantial room to thwart the impact of
Supreme Court rulings they do not like by reading them narrowly
and limiting their application,181 and given the volume of cases that
these courts are deciding, there is little that the Supreme Court can
do about it.182
All this is to say that supreme judgements are coupled with
supreme weakness. As Justice Jackson observed, the Supreme
Court is “in vital respects a dependent body.”183 This recognition
has its own implications for the departmentalist position—if the
179. POSNER, supra note 20, at 273.
180. MATTHEW E.K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER 164 (2011); see also id.
at 163 (noting that the Supreme Court can sometimes use lower court judges to implement
significant change and that such cases “almost always involve the Court designating a
particular class of citizens as immune from criminal prosecution or civil action”).
181. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 156, at 313 (“Lower-court judges can hamper the
commands of higher courts by avoiding, limiting or even defying them—as many lower courts
did with the U.S. Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions.”); id. at 694 (noting that lower
courts must follow Supreme Court decisions but in doing so they can limit or facilitate im-
plementation).
182. As Judge Posner notes, the federal courts of appeals decided over 56,000 cases in 2003,
compared to around 3700 in 1960, while state courts of last resort decided over 25,000 in 2002.
See POSNER, supra note 20, at 269; see also id. at 374 (noting that “the Court decides such a
small percentage of cases and thus has only limited control over the lower federal courts
(which tend therefore to go their own way, generating conflicts that the Court may take many
years to get around to resolving)”); id. at 143 (“[S]o few court of appeals decisions are reviewed
by the Supreme Court (currently less than 1 percent) that the threat of reversal cannot be
much of a constraint on court of appeals decision making.”).
183. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 10 (1955)). In the end, the
Supreme Court’s dependence on the people and their representatives was, for Alexander
Bickel, “how and why judicial review is consistent with the theory and practice of political
democracy.” BICKEL, supra note 67, at 258.
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representative branches have equal authority to interpret the
Constitution, then they actually have more interpretive power than
the Supreme Court, because their interpretive authority is bolstered
by the ability to enforce those interpretations too.184 But my primary
interest here is the implications of the point for the Court’s constitu-
tional decision-making. On this score, Justice O’Connor’s comments
are instructive. She writes: 
We don’t have standing armies to enforce opinions, we rely on
the confidence of the public in the correctness of those decisions.
That’s why we have to be aware of public opinions and of at-
titudes toward our system of justice, and it is why we must try
to keep and build that trust.185
The Justices understand their institutional vulnerability and the
limits it places on what the Supreme Court can realistically do.
Few cases illustrate the point better than Brown, so I return here
briefly to provide a glimpse of the internal view. Going into Brown
II, the Justices knew that their desegregation decree would be met
with fierce resistance.186 “[N]othing could injure the court more than
to issue orders that cannot be enforced,” Justice Black told his
colleagues in conference, concluding, “[T]he less we say the better off
184. As to the normative implications of this point, I paraphrase a comment from one of my
readers noted earlier: departmentalism would give a man widely viewed as unfit to be Pres-
ident more power over our Constitution than the Supreme Court, and this should give us
pause about being a departmentalist. For the original comment, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 160, at 380 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that “‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers and that “liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either of the other departments”
(quoting 1 CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 173 (Thomas Nugent trans., Baroche
Books) (1748)).
185. Sandra Day O’Connor, Public Trust as a Dimension of Equal Justice: Some
Suggestions to Increase Public Trust, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 10, 13.
186. States in the deep South had dismissed the Justices’ invitation to submit briefs on how
enforcement should proceed, signaling their intent to ignore the decision entirely. See
KLARMAN, supra note 169, at 314. And in a moment of brutal honesty, the lead lawyer for the
South told the Justices at oral argument that there would be no attempt to comply. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 246-47 (quoting the lead lawyer for the South as stating at oral
argument, “Mr. Chief Justice, to say we will conform depends on the decree handed down....
I would have to tell you that right now we would not conform—we would not send our white
children to the Negro schools”).
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we are.”187 Justice Minton agreed, stating that the Supreme Court
would “reveal its own weakness” if it issued a “futile” decree.188
Deadlines and timetables just invited defiance, the Justices
reasoned.189 The result was an order requiring “all deliberate
speed.”190
One last point merits mention: what is at issue when Supreme
Court rulings go unenforced is greater than the stakes of any given
case. Disobedience of Supreme Court rulings reveals the Court’s
weakness; it shows that the emperor has no clothes and that the
Supreme Court cannot, without help, make anyone do much of
anything. That, in turn, renders the Court vulnerable to future
disregard of its rulings.191 In short, nonenforcement undermines
the Supreme Court’s legitimacy—its ability to say what the law
means and have the people respect and follow its pronouncements
even when they disagree.192 And that is a problem because legit-
imacy is all the Court has.193 So when Justice Black said that
“nothing could injure the court more than to issue orders that
187. KLARMAN, supra note 169, at 314, 317 (second alteration in original) (quoting Justice
Black).
188. Id. at 314 (quoting Justice Minton).
189. See id. at 314-18 (discussing the Justices’ desire in Brown II to avoid issuing orders
that the South could easily defy).
190. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
191. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723,
781 (2009) (“Just as a traffic light ceases to coordinate behavior if it becomes known that
everyone ignores the traffic light, the court’s ability to coordinate behavior collapses if people
learn that their beliefs about how others react to judicial decisions are wrong. Once the belief
spreads that there are no consequences to disobeying the court, the court will find it difficult
to command obedience again.”); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS 95 (1978) (“A court unmindful of [its] limits will find that more and more
of its pronouncements are unfulfilled promises, which will ultimately discredit and denude
the function of constitutional adjudication.”).
192. See James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court:
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 204-
05 (2014) (discussing what some call legitimacy and political scientists call “diffuse support”
but in both cases refers to the public’s willingness to abide by decisions even when they
disagree).
193. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“[T]he Court
cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it
cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it
demands.”).
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cannot be enforced,”194 he spoke a truth that is ever present on the
Justices’ minds.195 At issue in every case is not just the Court’s
ruling, but the power and prestige of the Supreme Court itself.
E. Statutory Pushback
The last major means by which the people and their represen-
tatives control the finality of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
decisions is their ability to pass statutes that push back against the
Court’s rulings and, in so doing, test and retest the Court’s com-
mitment to its prior pronouncements. On occasion, these statutes
purport to actually reverse a constitutional ruling, and are either
ignored as obviously unconstitutional, or invoked as binding
authority and ultimately struck down.196 But most often, these
statutes skirt the boundaries of established constitutional rules.197
By necessity, Supreme Court decisions take place within the context
of a particular factual setting. As such, there is always room for
legislative action that is inconsistent with the spirit of a constitu-
tional decision but not obviously within the four corners of its
rule.198 Statutory pushback is one way—perhaps even the most
common way—that the people and their representatives express
194. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 185. For a candid recognition of the point by a federal court of appeals
judge, see Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Norms: A Judge’s Perspective, in NORMS AND THE LAW,
supra note 18, at 230, 231-32 (discussing the various ways that the representative branches
can obstruct courts and noting that “only one of these threats looms large to judges ... and that
is the possibility that our mandates might not be carried out by the executive or legislative
branches.... [T]he awareness that we can do little to compel enforcement of our judgments is
a real, recurring element in judicial thinking”).
196. An example is 18 U.S.C. § 3501, originally passed in 1968, which purported to make
the lack of Miranda warnings one of several “factors to be taken into consideration by the
judge,” while noting that the lack of Miranda warnings “need not be conclusive on the issue
of voluntariness of the confession.” 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2012). The provision was ignored for
decades, and then invoked and ultimately struck down in Dickerson v. United States. See 530
U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and
applying the Constitution.”); see also R. Ted Cruz, In Memoriam: William H. Reinquist, 119
HARV. L. REV. 10, 14 (2005) (“[F]or three decades, § 3501 lay dormant on the statute books,
all but ignored.”).
197. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 800 (“Direct challenges to judicial supremacy are
rare. More common are efforts to evade the logic of the Court’s reasoning and to influence
subsequent judicial opinions.”).
198. See Kramer, supra note 32, at 970 (“Congress, the President, the states, and other
relevant players find room to act in, around, and between judicial decisions.”). 
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disagreement with the Court’s constitutional pronouncements. And
experience shows that the Supreme Court is remarkably respon-
sive to this sort of pushback, presumably for the same reasons it
considers state and federal legislation in its constitutional decision-
making in the first instance.199
Statutory pushback against the Supreme Court’s decisions in both
Roe v. Wade200 and Furman v. Georgia201 illustrates the point nicely.
In the first fifteen years following Roe, forty-eight states passed 306
anti-abortion restrictions, almost all of which presented issues that
the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed in Roe but which
clearly resisted its logic.202 Shortly thereafter, the Court decided
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which
watered down Roe’s holding and accommodated the country’s
strongly expressed legislative views.203 Furman is a similar story. In
the wake of the Court’s 1972 decision striking down the death
penalty as it was then administered,204 thirty-five states reinstated
the death penalty with statutes that were widely viewed as suf-
fering from the same infirmities identified in Furman.205 Four years
199. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing constitutional decision-making based on state
legislative consensus); supra Part I.C (discussing constitutional decision-making as a dialogue
with the legislative and executive branches). For a discussion of whether the Supreme Court
should take such statutes into consideration in its constitutional decision-making, while
recognizing that it does so, see generally Robert F. Nagel, Disagreement and Interpretation,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 11, 24-33.
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
202. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 62, 322 (discussing statutes imposing spousal
consent, parental notification and consent, informed consent, and waiting period require-
ments, and discussing the opportunities those statutes provided for the Supreme Court to
soften its Roe ruling).
203. 505 U.S. 833, 876, 882, 886-87, 899 (1992) (adopting an “undue burden” test and
upholding state-imposed waiting periods, informed consent, and parental notification require-
ments); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 382 (noting that Casey “watered down Roe in
important ways and which—all polls and pundits agreed—was remarkably in line with
popular opinion”); Post & Siegel, supra note 123, at 429 (“Casey authorizes the Court to
respond to both sides of the abortion dispute by fashioning a constitutional law in which each
side can find recognition. Casey famously concludes both that ‘the essential holding of Roe v.
Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed’ and that ‘the rigid trimester framework
of Roe’ should be overturned, thus authorizing for the first time fetal protective regulations
throughout pregnancy.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 878)).
204. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
205. See Lain, Furman Fundamentals, supra note 119, at 47-48 (discussing legislative
backlash to the Furman ruling); id. at 57-60 (discussing widespread knowledge that the new
death penalty statutes did nothing to fix the problems that plagued the old ones, including
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later, the Court upheld these new statutes, explicitly recognizing
their relevance to its constitutional analysis.206
All told—and this is the point of the entire preceding discus-
sion—the people and their representatives have a number of ways
to control the staying power of Supreme Court decisions with which
they disagree. Some are more effective than others. Some take more
time than others. And some are more confrontational than others.
But they all provide outlets for the people and their representatives
to influence, if not control, the Supreme Court’s constitutional
decision-making. And they all have been successful in actually
changing the Court’s constitutional views, even when the control
mechanism at issue technically failed. These mechanisms are not
only levers of power, but also opportunities for expression, and that
matters in light of the Supreme Court’s proclivity to respond to the
people’s clearly expressed constitutional views.207
If the notion of the people and their representatives expressing
their views to the Supreme Court, and the Court responding, sounds
familiar, it should—this is the back side of the dialogue between the
Court and American people discussed in Part I. When the Supreme
Court issues a constitutional ruling, that dialogue is not over; to the
contrary, it has formally just begun. The Court’s voice in this
dialogue is weighted, to be sure. It purports to reign supreme. But
what happens next will decide the validity of that declaration; it
depends on what the people do. The Court rules, the people react,
and the Court responds to that.208 Constitutional contestation—this
time between the Court and the people and their representatives—
statements by state governors as they signed new legislation that it was probably uncon-
stitutional).
206. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is now
evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard [the death penalty]
as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. The most marked indication of society’s
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The
legislatures of at least 35 states have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty
for at least some crimes that result in the death of another person.” (footnote omitted)).
207. See Graber, supra note 16, at 72 (“[T]he record indicates that the justices are fairly
responsive to public demands that the Court retreat from earlier decisions.... The Supreme
Court is simply not structured to impede a determined majority for any length of time.”).
208. For prominent statements of this phenomenon, see BICKEL, supra note 191, at 91-95;
DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 299-325; FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 381-85; Friedman,
supra note 93, at 653-58.
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continues until the nation finally settles in on an understanding of
the Constitution that everyone can live with.
Granted, sometimes it takes a while to work all that out. And
granted, the public may still disagree with a decision in the end. But
a brief look at the two most oft-cited examples of this happen-
ing—the Supreme Court’s protection of flag burning and invalida-
tion of school prayer—is instructive. The Court’s protection of flag
burning in 1989 and 1990 was incredibly unpopular, but efforts to
amend the Constitution stalled on the notion that perhaps robust
free speech protections were a good thing after all,209 and the public
quickly turned its attention to other things.210 By way of compari-
son, the Court’s invalidation of state-sponsored school prayer in
1962211 and bible reading in 1963212 produced an even greater fire-
storm and for a longer period of time, but here it is not clear how
much the people actually disagreed with the Court’s rulings. In both
cases, the proposed constitutional amendment to overturn the
decisions, which ultimately became a plank in the 1964 Republican
Party Platform, took a position no different from what the Supreme
Court had held.213
209. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 247 (noting that Congress’s repeated refusal
to amend the Constitution to limit the First Amendment’s reach is due in part to “ever
growing lawmaker acquiescence to the flag-burning decision”); id. at 252 (quoting Walter
Dellinger in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing as saying: “We love the flag because it
symbolizes the United States; but we must love the Constitution even more, because the
Constitution is not a symbol. It is the thing itself.”).
210. See Tom Donnelly, Essay, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
159, 176 (“Congress failed to pass a constitutional amendment and the American people
quickly turned their attention to other matters.”).
211. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
212. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
213. In both cases, the Supreme Court’s problem with the religious exercise was that the
state was leading it—the state wrote the prayer in one case, and chose the Bible verses (and
the version of the Bible to read them from) in the other. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-27
(invalidating state-sponsored Bible reading under the Establishment Clause); Engel, 370 U.S.
at 422-25 (invalidating state-sponsored school prayer under the Establishment Clause). Here
is what the 1964 Republican Party Plank supported: “a Constitutional amendment permitting
those individuals and groups who choose to do so to exercise their religion freely in public
places, provided religious exercises are not prepared or prescribed by the state or political
subdivision thereof and no person’s participation therein is coerced.” REPUBLICAN PLATFORM
1964, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1972, at 677, 683 (Donald Bruce Johnson & Kirk
H. Porter eds., 5th ed. 1973). For a discussion of the confusion that marked the public’s
response to Engel, and the factors that caused it, see Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the
American Way, supra note 119, at 507-25.
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The point of mentioning these cases, as notoriously unpopular as
they are, is to give some idea of how the process actually works. The
Supreme Court’s decisions will not always reflect the people’s views,
even at the end of the dialogic process. Sometimes the Court will
issue an unpopular decision and stick to its guns. But the people
either come to accept those decisions, understanding them better,
or at least understanding that the Constitution sometimes requires
protecting an unpopular view,214 or they do not accept those de-
cisions, and the law evolves until they do. 
And what that means in the context of the current discussion is
that the Supreme Court’s constitutional pronouncements are final
in only the most limited of ways. The Court decides the case, and for
a time its understanding of the Constitution is final. But in the
wake of the Court’s decision, the people and their representatives
respond, and the dynamic process of determining what the Constitu-
tion means—not to settle the case, but to settle the larger constitu-
tional controversy, the rules that the nation must live by—begins.215
What Alexander Bickel recognized as true nearly forty years ago
remains true today:
The Supreme Court’s judgments may be put forth as universally
prescriptive; but they actually become so only when they gain
widespread assent. They bind of their own force no one but the
parties to a litigation. To realize the promise that all others
similarly situated will be similarly bound, the Court’s judgments
need the assent and the cooperation first of the political institu-
tions, and ultimately of the people.216
In other words—this time, those of Larry Kramer—“It ain’t over
‘till it’s over, and the final arbiter of whether a given action is
214. See Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1358
(2005) (“[P]oliticians and ordinary citizens alike can and do appreciate that there are ad-
vantages in giving the Court some leeway to act as a check on politics. This includes
understanding that many benefits of judicial involvement are systemic and long term, and so
may require accepting individual decisions with which one disagrees.”).
215. Put another way, the Supreme Court settles controversies, but with the flexibility to
rethink that settlement should the people and their representatives convince it to do so.
216. BICKEL, supra note 191, at 90; see also id. at 181 (“[The Court’s] authority, although
asserted in absolute terms, is in practice limited and ambivalent, and with respect to any
given enterprise or field of policy, temporary.”).
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constitutional is the public itself.”217 We will know when it is over
because there will be no traction in the system to undo what the
Court has done.218 
This is the reality of judicial supremacy. The Supreme Court’s
pronouncements are final in only the thinnest of ways and supreme
only to the extent that the people and their representatives are wil-
ling to accept them. Maybe that is why the people like it as much as
they do.219
III. THREE IMPLICATIONS OF SOFT SUPREMACY
Thus far, I have endeavored to provide an accurate account of the
reality of judicial supremacy, one that recognizes the role of the
people and their representatives in the Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional decision-making process. Here I turn to three implications of
this account—first considering what judicial supremacy does for our
democratic discourse, then considering what judicial supremacy
does for the people, and finally considering what judicial supremacy
does for the representative branches. In light of the numerous and
important ways that judicial supremacy serves the representative
branches, I ultimately ask whether departmentalism is good for
even departmentalists, and conclude that the answer is no. What
departmentalists appear to want is what they already have, and
that is supremacy sometimes—the essence of soft supremacy.
A. What Soft Supremacy Does for Our Democratic Discourse
Critics claim that judicial supremacy not only takes the people’s
voice in determining the meaning of the Constitution, but also shuts
it down. Larry Kramer has been particularly forceful in making this
claim, arguing that “[s]upremacy is an ideological tenet whose whole
purpose is to persuade ordinary citizens that, whatever they may
think about the Justices’ constitutional rulings, it is not their place
217. Kramer, supra note 101, at 1452.
218. See id. (noting that public acceptance is “measured by the inability of proponents or
opponents to gain political traction anywhere in the system to undo what has been done”).
219. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (noting public support for judicial
supremacy). 
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to gainsay the Court.”220 Supremacy tells the people that “the
meaning of their Constitution is something beyond their compass,
something that should be left to others,” he writes.221 But this is not
what we see in practice; indeed, just the opposite is true. Ordinary
citizens make claims about the Constitution all the time,222 and my
argument here is that this sort of democratic discourse occurs not in
spite of judicial supremacy, but in good measure because of it.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making can generate
any number of reactions, but one of the most prominent is back-
lash.223 Backlash can occur even if a constitutional ruling has the
balance of public opinion on its side because those who agree with
the ruling just nod along, while those who disagree on the merits
mobilize.224 Defeat, to borrow from Jesse Choper, is the “great[ ] en-
ergizer.”225 And Supreme Court rulings energize the opposition in
spades. They unite critics, inspire action, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, provide a clear target for directing resistance.
Judicial supremacy plays an important role in this process, for it
is the purported finality of the Supreme Court’s decisions that
makes those decisions so important to the larger polity and so out-
rageous to those who disagree. To be sure, backlash is primarily a
response to the merits of a decision, and it can happen in the wake
of democratic decision-making as well.226 But Supreme Court de-
cisions are special in this regard—not because they give rise to
laments of an unelected judiciary deciding an issue that should have
been decided by the people themselves (although they do), but
220. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 233.
221. Id. at 229.
222. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
223. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 2624-25 (discussing the backlash thesis and
suggesting that the most significant impact of Supreme Court decisions is to embolden those
who oppose the Court’s decision on the merits).
224. See Lain, supra note 20, at 182.
225. CHOPER, supra note 151, at 134.
226. Consider, for example, the backlash that followed Congress’s passage of the Affordable
Care Act. See Jason Millman, Democrats Are Bracing for Another Obamacare Backlash,
WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2015/02/17/democrats-are-bracing-for-another-obamacare-backlash [https://perma.cc/2U4P-
2KR9]; Jayne O’Donnell et al., As Obamacare Choices Dwindle, Feds Face Consumer, Political
Backlash, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2016/08/29/obamacare-choices-dwindle-feds-face-consumer-political-backlash/89403698/
[https://perma.cc/XLL4-DKBH].
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rather because they give rise to outrage among those who disagree
with a decision that they are now stuck with it. If the Supreme
Court’s constitutional rulings did not purport to be final, it would
not matter so terribly much how the Court rules.227
Yet judicial supremacy’s contribution to the democratic discourse
is not just about its ability to galvanize debate like only the Su-
preme Court can. It is also (and perhaps more importantly) about
what happens to the democratic discourse as a result. Judicial
supremacy leads to constitutional decisions that are what Barry
Friedman calls “sticky”—they can be overturned, but it takes sub-
stantial mobilization, often over a sustained period of time, to
induce that sort of reconsideration.228 In short, they are final unless
the Court becomes convinced that they should not be. This sticki-
ness, Friedman explains, creates the need for a deeper, and broader,
consensus than what ordinarily inures in the political process, and
attempts to forge that consensus, in turn, lead to extensive public
engagement on the question of what the Constitution means and
why.229 Friedman claims that the chief virtue of this process is its
result—a sifting out of immediate preferences from the “deeper,
more enduring values” that mark the nature of constitutional com-
mitments.230 But others have argued that the process is equally
227. See Friedman, supra note 59, at 169 (“Without this form of [judicial] supremacy, there
is not much in the way of a countermajoritarian problem. Judicial decisions can simply be
ignored or modified by the other branches.”); see also Pozen, supra note 8, at 2050 (“If
amendments were readily achievable, one would not find such anguish about judicial
supremacy.”).
228. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 383 (“[I]t turns out that one of the most important
features of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution is that they are ‘sticky,’
which is to say that they are difficult to change or get around. Either the people must amend
the Constitution, or they must persuade the justices to change their minds.”).
229. See Barry Friedman, Discipline and Method: The Making of The Will of the People,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 877, 916 (“[P]recisely because of the stickiness of judicial review, we
are forced to seek and ultimately forge broader consensus on the most difficult constitutional
issues of our day.”); Friedman, supra note 124, at 1239-40 (“[T]he very ‘stickiness’ of consti-
tutional decisions forces a public debate that is different from what occurs in ordinary politics
over nonconstitutional matters. It is precisely because it is difficult to change or get around
Supreme Court constitutional rulings that a longer-term and deeper mobilization occurs.”
(footnote omitted)).
230. Friedman, supra note 229, at 916; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 383 (“[I]t turns
out there is a certain virtue in this stickiness; it plays an essential role in separating out the
considered ‘constitutional’ views of the American people from passing fancy.”); Barry
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72
U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1297 (2004) (“The benefit of the process of constitutional change is that
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important for its deliberative quality and ability to engage actors
beyond the political and social elite, concluding that to the extent we
have a deliberative democracy, we owe it in part (ironically) to the
power of an unelected Supreme Court.231
One can see the same sort of galvanizing effect on the formal
political process, with Roe v. Wade232 being one of the clearest illus-
trations of the point. By conventional wisdom, Roe shut down the
political process,233 but experience shows that just the opposite is
true. Roe utterly transformed American politics, mobilizing the po-
litical process to resist the ruling in every possible way. From
presidential elections to Supreme Court nominations to ordinary
legislation and more, Roe energized electoral politics on the abortion
issue because, as several scholars have noted, it raised the stakes.234
What Lawrence Sager writes about Roe and other cases is right: no
“sensible observer of our political life [could] conclude that those
matters which do get taken up by the judiciary in the name of the
Constitution are thereby swept off the popular political agenda.”235
If anything, the Court’s pronouncements have a galvanizing effect
on the political process instead.
it serves the separating function, of helping to determine and distinguish between immediate
political preference and deeper commitments.”). 
231. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 354, 360, 374-75 (2010).
232. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
233. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 519 (2001) (“[A] standard critique of Roe v. Wade is that it was
not only countermajoritarian, but that it preempted the normal operation of politics, which
was in the process of reforming or repealing abortion laws state by state.”). But see Lain,
supra note 20, at 143 (examining the historical record and concluding that “it is not the case,
as conventional wisdom would have it, that Roe short-circuited legislative efforts moving in
the same direction. Roe did not kill legislative reform—by 1973, it was already dead.” (foot-
note omitted)).
234. See Post & Siegel, supra note 123, at 403 (recognizing the point and quoting William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering
the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1310 (2005); and Friedman, supra note 230, at 1310
as noting the same). For an excellent discussion of “Roe rage” as an important illustration of
how backlash can invigorate popular and political discourse, thereby enhancing the dem-
ocratic legitimacy of the larger constitutional order, see generally Post & Siegel, supra note
123. For a discussion of how even the Supreme Court’s denial of rights claims can energize
the political process for change using Bowers v. Hardwick’s refusal to invalidate criminal pro-
hibitions on same-sex sodomy as an example, see DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 186-89.
235. SAGER, supra note 3, at 220; see also id. at 221 (“It would have been silly in prospect
to think that these cases could lay the social controversies with which they contended to rest,
and utterly wrong in retrospect to think that they have done so.”).
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For the formalists out there who think the people have no
business trying to influence the development of constitutional law—
the law is what the text, or original meaning, or whatever other
source of guidance one ascribes to says it is, and nothing more—the
process I have described is a bad thing. Those who lament the fate
of certain decisions that were softened, or even abandoned, as a
result of the success of this process might reasonably conclude it is
a bad thing too.236 But in light of the current discussion and attacks
on judicial supremacy on democratic grounds, one might consider
the views of Justice Blackmun, who once stated, “It may prove to
be well in the long run that people do get disturbed and concerned
and interested in what the Court does. I think on balance that this
is a good thing for the country, because the Supreme Court of the
United States belongs to the country.”237 By and large, this sym-
posium contribution has been an extended discussion of why Justice
Blackmun’s words are true—why the Court belongs to the country,
and the Constitution too.
B. What Soft Supremacy Does for the People
To understand what soft supremacy does for the people, one must
first understand the dissonance that sometimes occurs between
the people and the representative branches. It is widely assumed
that the representative branches represent the people—if not well,
then at least better than unelected judges do.238 But sometimes just
the opposite is true. Sometimes the representative branches are not
so representative, leaving an unelected (but highly responsive)
236. For my own proclivities in this regard, compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240
(1972) (invalidating the death penalty as then administered), with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 (1976) (reinstating the death penalty under circumstances similar to those found
problematic in Furman).
237. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 18, at 308 (quoting A Justice Speaks Out: A Conversation
with Harry A. Blackmun (CNN television broadcast Dec. 4, 1982)).
238. See Kramer, supra note 32, at 999 (“Legislatures do not perfectly mirror or translate
popular will, and courts are to some extent responsive to democratic pressures. But it would
be ludicrous to treat the two as comparable in this respect.”); Waldron, supra note 1, at 44
(“Both in theory and in political practice, the legislature is thought of as the main embodiment
of popular government: it is where responsible representatives of the people engage in what
they would proudly describe as the self-government of the society. Now there are lots of
dignified ways of describing the judiciary, but ‘locus of representative authority’ is unlikely
to be one of them.”).
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Supreme Court to give voice to the people’s views instead. This,
then, is what soft supremacy does for the people: it gives force of law
to their widely held views even when the representative branches
do not. 
To see the point as a real, reoccurring phenomenon rather than
a rare fluke requires some understanding of the impediments to
effective representation by the representative branches. Some are
structural impediments, obstacles to effectuating the will of the peo-
ple that are built into the system as a matter of constitutional
design.239 The states’ equal representation in the Senate, which re-
sults in a minority of the population having a majority of the votes,
is perhaps the best example.240 Other impediments are more
operational in nature, consisting of the various “institutional habits
and characteristics”241 of the representative branches that make
effectuating change difficult, even when backed by majority will.
The congressional committee system is one example; the Senate
filibuster is another.242
But neither of these sorts of impediments is responsible for the
democratic dysfunction that has marked the representative branch-
es over the last several decades, and neither is growing more acute.
That distinction goes to politics, and, on this score, gerrymandering
is as good a place as any to start. Now more than ever, sophisticated
computer algorithms allow for the creation of voting districts with
equal population and just about any political configuration.243 As a
239. For an excellent discussion of the antimajoritarian features of our structure of
government, see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 25-78 (2006); see
also CHOPER, supra note 151, at 12-25 (summarizing structural impediments to majoritarian
change); Lain, supra note 20, at 146-48 (same).
240. See CHOPER, supra note 151, at 16 (“The Senate is composed of two legislators from
each state who have equal voting power irrespective of their state’s population. Mathe-
matically, this permits senators who represent about 15 percent of the national citizenry—and
who were elected by just more than half of that number—to constitute a voting majority, able
to overrule the preferences of senators representing 85 percent of the population.”); see also
LEVINSON, supra note 239, at 53 (“‘Majority rule’ within the Senate may have only a random
relationship to majority rule within the country as a whole.”).
241. BICKEL, supra note 67, at 18.
242. See CHOPER, supra note 151, at 17-18 (discussing the use of the filibuster and
committee system to thwart majority rule).
243. See Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313,
324 (2003) (“New computer technology has moved the gerrymander from an art to a science,
making it far easier to create districts of equal population with any desired political con-
figuration. Where voters once chose among politicians, now politicians select voters.”).
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result, the party that controls congressional redistricting can “pack”
like-minded voters into districts to ensure that a particular party
wins, and “crack” the voting strength of the opposing party’s con-
stituents across districts to ensure that it loses.244 Gerrymandering
is all about wasting votes—“diluting” them, in election law speak—
and it is wildly effective, routinely resulting in one party winning
the most seats in a state despite the other party winning the most
votes.245 Indeed, that is the very point.
Because gerrymandering creates one-party “safe seats,”246 it
distorts not only electoral results, but also the electoral process as
a mechanism by which representatives are held accountable to the
people they represent.247 Almost 90 percent of the House of Rep-
resentatives seats are safe seats today.248 As such, the race that
matters most is not the general election, but the party primary that
precedes it—and the constituency that matters most is not the
general public, but the committed partisans who comprise the par-
ty base.249 This phenomenon, in turn, pushes candidates to the
244. See Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerry-
mandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 561, 567 (2011) (discussing packing and cracking strategy
in gerrymandering).
245. See id. at 577 (discussing schemes that “dilute” the vote of minority voters). The
Princeton Election Consortium concluded that at least twenty-six seats of the thirty-one-seat
advantage Republicans had in the House after the 2012 election were gerrymandered seats,
largely a result of redistricting done in the wake of the 2010 census. See Sam Wang, Gerry-
manders, Part I: Busting the Both-Sides-Do-It Myth, PRINCETON ELECTION CONSORTIUM (Dec.
30, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://election.princeton.edu/2012/12/30/gerrymanders-part-1-busting-
the-both-sides-do-it-myth/ [https://perma.cc/KS5M-QGLV].
246. 2015 Report Cards: Safe House Seats, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
members/report-cards/2015/house-safe-seat [https://perma.cc/G62U-GSEX] (categorizing 385
of 440 House seats—87.5 percent—as “safe seats”). This is not to say that gerrymandering is
the only cause of safe seats. For an explanation grounded in people’s tendency to reside in
homogeneous communities, see generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009).
247. See Patrick Basham & Dennis Polhill, Uncompetitive Elections and the American
Political System, POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 30, 2005, at 2 (noting that the House of
Representatives was designed to reflect “shifting popular will” and that “[t]he decline in
congressional political competitiveness is grossly inhibiting the extent to which the con-
temporary House serves this function of democratic responsiveness”). 
248. See id. at 6 (“Almost 90 percent of Americans live in congressional districts where the
outcome is so certain that their votes are irrelevant.”); see also supra note 246 (noting that 385
of 440 House seats are considered to be safe seats—87.5 percent).
249. See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 298 (2011) (“[P]rimaries tend to be dominated
by the most committed and active party members, who tend to be more ideologically extreme
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ideological extremes, pandering for partisan votes to avoid “getting
primaried.”250 The upshot is an electoral process that produces de-
cidedly off-center results. As a practical matter, representatives
today do not represent the people; they represent the hardliners
that form their party base.
The impact on Congress is palpable. Although gerrymandering is
not the only corrosive force in politics today, it is one of the most
powerful.251 Today’s Congress is marked by acute party polarization
along ideological lines and the demise of party moderates. As Rick
Pildes writes, “In 1976, moderates constituted 30% of the House; by
2002, this proportion had shrunk to 8%. Similarly, in 1970, moder-
ates constituted 41% of the Senate; today, that proportion is 5%.”252
If it seems as though Congress has lost touch with moderate,
mainstream views, that is because it has.
And this development, in turn, has had ill effects of its own. Party
loyalists have little reason to reach across the aisle; indeed, the
incentives all run the other way, leading to what one veteran
Congress-watcher describes as “the middle-finger approach to
governing, driven by a mind-set that has brought us the most
rancorous and partisan atmosphere ... in nearly 35 years.”253 As one
might expect, congressional lawmaking has suffered too, resulting
in what political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson describe
as “policymaking that starkly and repeatedly departs from the
than the average party member. As a result, primaries tend to be controlled by the extremes
of each party, which can affect which kinds of candidates prevail.” (footnote omitted)).
250. See generally ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, GETTING PRIMARIED: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARY CHALLENGES (2013); Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous
Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2012/10/the-
league-of/309084/ [https://perma.cc/KW79-Y64X] (quoting a Congressman as saying that there
are some Republicans “who would be inclined to be more moderate, if they didn’t have to fear
a primary challenge”).
251. For insightful discussions of the connection between gerrymandering and party
polarization, see generally Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the
Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POLITICS 75 (2006); Jamie L. Carson et
al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives, 35 AM. POL. RES.
878 (2007); J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform
to Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543 (2011).
252. Pildes, supra note 249, at 277 (footnote omitted).
253. Norman Ornstein, GOP’s Approach to Continuity: Not Just Unfortunate. Stupid,
ECONOMIST (June 9, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/2745245 [https://perma.cc/JFA8-
QZV6].
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center of public opinion.”254 We tend to assume that the people’s
representatives represent the people’s views, but in serious and
substantial ways, they do not.
Compounding the problem is the incumbency rate in Congress,
which ranges between 90 and 99 percent—largely due to incum-
bency advantages that elected representatives themselves put in
place.255 Political scientists are right in concluding that when it
comes to Congress, “many voters lack any real say in who rep-
resents them.”256 If the virtue of having elected representatives is
the ability to vote them out, then it is worth noting that this is not
an ability that the people realistically have.
None of this includes the dysfunction that arises from inputs into
the democratic decision-making process, which have a corrosive
effect of their own. Scholars have long lamented the influence of
special interest groups, which, as Rebecca Brown has observed,
“widely undermine[ ] ... any confidence that the system of represen-
tative government is doing the work that we count on it to do.”257
Today, however, that influence is exacerbated by a world of super
PACs able to accept unlimited political contributions and make
unlimited political expenditures.258 Money talks. And when money
254. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION AND
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 16 (2005); see also GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22 (2003)
(“[T]he idea that legislative outcomes should serve as a paragon of democracy or a proxy for
the will of ‘majorities’ seems almost bizarre.”).
255. See Basham & Polhill, supra note 247, at 2 (reporting that “99.3 percent of unindicted
congressional and state legislative incumbents won reelection” in the 1980s and recom-
mending that elected officials be disconnected from campaign and election rule making and
regulation); Chris Cillizza, People Hate Congress. But Most Incumbents Get Re-Elected. What
Gives?, WASH. POST (May 9, 2013), https://washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/09/
people-hate-congress-but-most-incumbents-get-re-elected-what-gives/ [https://perma.cc/2D79-
WXTF] (noting an incumbency rate of 90 to 91 percent in the 2012 election); see also Michael
J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 498
(1997) (discussing various entrenchment measures adopted by policymakers and concluding
that “[i]n neither of these [entrenchment] contexts is legislative decisionmaking likely to be
majoritarian; judicial review quite plausibly would be more so” (footnote omitted)).
256. Basham & Polhill, supra note 247, at 2 (quoting Ross K. Baker, Why Your Vote Often
Means So Little, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/mar/18/opinion/
oe-baker18 [https://perma.cc/DY7V-ZYFB]).
257. Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 23, 23-24 (2006).
258. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (recognizing First Amendment
right of interest groups to make unlimited expenditures in support or opposition of a candi-
date so long as they are independent of the campaign and candidate).
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talks to politicians, politicians are prone to listen. In the wake of
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,259 they do not have
much choice; monied special interests could spend unlimited sums
advertising for, or against, them in their next campaign.260 This is
a concern in and of itself, but coupled with our distressingly low
voter turnout rates—49 to 57 percent in presidential elections and
33 to 37 percent in off-term congressional elections261—the problem
is particularly acute. Monied special interests are wielding influ-
ence well beyond the number of voters they represent,262 and their
influence is even greater when the voters who could offset that
influence do not show up to vote.
All this is to say that the current “fetishism of representation”263
that drives much of the judicial supremacy debate could use a
serious reality check. Attacks on judicial supremacy as anti-
democratic tout the virtues of self-governance and assume a
259. See id. at 372.
260. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html [https://
perma.cc/6YJV-S2UX] (“The Supreme Court has handed lobbyists a new weapon. A lobbyist
can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company, labor union or interest group
will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election.”); see also Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Court’s
ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”); Barack
Obama, Statement on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 54, 54 (Jan. 21, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-
president-todays-supreme-court-decision-0 [https://perma.cc/DJB4-FKVD] (“With its ruling
today, the Supreme Court has given a green light to a new stampede of special interest money
in our politics. It is a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies
and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown
out the voices of everyday Americans.”).
261. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 244 (2012); see also Lain, supra note 20, at 154 (discussing low voter
turnout and noting that “[e]qually problematic, those who vote are not representative of the
country at large; they are (among other things) older, wealthier, and whiter”).
262. See CHOPER, supra note 151, at 23 (“[I]t is generally agreed that by transmitting
pertinent information to key lawmakers, by skillfully and selectively applying pressure at
critical points in the system, and by expending massive sums of money—not infrequently in
an abusive, and occasionally criminal manner—[special interest groups] are able to exercise
power well beyond the force of the numbers of people they represent.”).
263. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of
Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
371, 400 (2012); see also id. at 400 n.154 (“I use fetishism here to denote the act of giving
something power that it does not inherently possess. In this context, the representative
system is arguably fetishized, because some scholars venerate it as if it had the power to
stand for the People when in fact it does not.”).
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reasonably well-functioning representative democracy.264 But that
is not the democracy we have. 
The point has rather obvious implications for the departmentalist
position, and so I pause for a moment to recognize those. As pre-
viously noted, departmentalists claim that the representative
branches have equal authority to say what the Constitution means
and are therefore not bound by what the Supreme Court says.265 To
the extent that this claim rests on democratic grounds—the notion
that the Constitution belongs to the people, and that the representa-
tive branches speak for them—the foregoing discussion suggests
that skepticism is in order. The representative branches today are
not even plausibly good at speaking for the people, offering a weak
rationale for diluting the Supreme Court’s interpretive power.
In light of the fact that the representative branches do not even
represent the people well, it is also unclear why one would think
they would do any better at expressing equally authoritative con-
stitutional views. Indeed, the available evidence suggests that they
may not be even interested in the enterprise. “[T]oday’s lawmakers
are less engaged in constitutional matters and less interested in
asserting their prerogative to interpret the Constitution independ-
ently,” Neal Devins writes, noting that “Congress seems more
interested in scoring rhetorical points than in engaging the Court on
constitutional questions.”266 The people’s representatives may care
about many things, but the thing they care about most is reelection,
and in a world of safe seats and polarized politics, that requires
264. See Josh Benson, The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, but It Rhymes: The Second Coming
of the Liberal Anti-Court Movement, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1071, 1083 (2008) (book review)
(“Perhaps most importantly, the Anti-Court scholars share a strong belief that the political
branches function reasonably well.... [T]he Court is the problem, not the solution—and the
solution is the other branches.”). Those who oppose judicial review rest their argument on the
same assumptions. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360 (2006) (explicitly resting the case against judicial review on
an assumption of “democratic institutions in reasonably good working order”); id. at 1362 (“I
belabor these points about a democratic culture and electoral and legislative institutions in
reasonably good working order because they will be key to the argument that follows.”).
265. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
266. Devins, supra note 149, at 66-67; see also id. at 55 (describing the theme of the essay
as showing “Congress’s interest in making symbolic statements on divisive social issues and
its lack of interest in challenging judicial authority by independently interpreting the Con-
stitution”); id. at 67 (“Indeed, today’s Congress ... seems quite accepting of judicial control of
constitutional questions.”).
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appeasing the party base.267 “Message politics” is the name of the
game, raising serious doubts about whether the representative
branches have the ability or inclination to assume the role that
departmentalists would have them play.268 Perhaps all of this would
change in a world without judicial supremacy, as some have
claimed.269 But our electoral system is not structured to resist the
off-center pull of partisan politics, so it is hard to imagine
departmentalism playing out in any other than a hyperpartisan
way.270
And that brings me back to judicial supremacy. In theory, the fact
that Supreme Court Justices are not elected renders them less
responsive to the will of the people.271 This is the problem with
267. See TUSHNET, supra note 63, at 87 (“The main concern about legislators’ incentives is
simple: They are elected. Their primary incentive is to retain their jobs.”); WHITTINGTON,
supra note 3, at 134 (“Legislators are driven by a desire to win reelection.... Legislators do
have other goals and desires ... but reelection is often a prerequisite to the pursuit of other
goals and it looms large in the calculations of members of legislatures.”); supra notes 246-50
and accompanying text (discussing importance of appeasing party base in safe-seat districts,
which is around 90 percent of all districts).
268. See Devins, supra note 149, at 56-58 (discussing a shift to “message politics” and the
“profound” consequences of political actors making statements not to make things happen, but
because the statements themselves have political payoffs); see also Neal Devins, The D’oh! of
Popular Constitutionalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1343-44 (2007) (book review) (“Does
Congress Represent the American People on Constitutional Questions? No way.... With
lawmakers and political parties often looking for ways to reach out to their respective partisan
bases, lawmakers increasingly see constitutional questions as unnecessary distractions.”). For
an early empirical study demonstrating Congress’s “abdication of its role as a constitutional
guardian” and explaining why electoral and political pressures make Congress a particularly
challenging venue for deliberating constitutional issues, see Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does
Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983).
269. See TUSHNET, supra note 63, at 82 (noting that judicial supremacy encourages
position-taking because “legislators may say to themselves, ‘I can get political mileage out of
taking a position on this question, without worrying that anything actually will happen,
because the courts will find the statute unconstitutional anyway’” and that this sort of
position-taking does not show that legislators actually want those statutes to go into effect,
or that they would be “incompetent constitutional interpreters” in a world without judicial
supremacy); id. at 101 (“The fact that legislators behave badly when they know that someone
is around to bail them out tells us little about how they would behave were they to have full
responsibility for their actions.”). 
270. See Whittington, supra note 96, at 825 (noting that elected officials exercising
independent interpretive authority are likely to be influenced by “the electoral pressure of
constituents or intermediate actors such as parties and interest groups” because “[t]hey are,
after all, representatives, and we would normally expect them to be responsive to the opinions
of their constituents”). 
271. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 170 n.4
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judicial supremacy, at least for those who oppose it on democratic
grounds—the Justices are not elected, so we cannot just “vote the
bastards out.”272 Indeed, this is what drives the claim that judicial
supremacy affords the people no say in constitutional decision-
making on the front side, and no control over what has been decided
on the back side.273 The entire case against judicial supremacy on
democratic grounds is built on the fact that the Justices are
unelected, and the assumed implications of that fact for their
decision-making.
For those who care only about the fact of electoral accountability
(or the lack thereof), judicial supremacy is hopelessly undemocratic
and nothing I can say here will change that view.274 But for those
who care about the point of electoral accountability—its purpose as
a mechanism for giving voice to the people’s views—it is worth
noting that in practice, electoral politics are a huge part of the
reason that the representative branches are not so representative.
And the Justices are not subject to any of those electoral distortions.
As Amanda Frost observes: 
[F]ederal judges’ insulation from electoral politics allows them
to bypass special interests, party activists, and campaign donors,
and listen instead to what the majority of the general public
prefers. Perhaps the Court’s value lies in the purity of its ma-
joritarianism[,] ... the luxury of listening to the general public
without the din of elections that so distracts the political
branches of government.275
(1982) (“[O]ne important reason we value electorally accountable policymaking is that we
think it more sensitive to the sentiments of majorities than is policymaking that is not
electorally accountable.”); see also supra note 238 and accompanying text (noting the wide-
spread assumption that, because they are elected, the representative branches represent the
people, if not well then at least better than the judicial branch). 
272. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
274. See Waldron, supra note 1, at 50 (“But if the process is non-democratic, it inherently
and necessarily does an injustice, in its operation, to the participatory aspirations of the
ordinary citizen. And it does this injustice, tyrannizes in this way, whether it comes up with
the correct result or not.”); see also CHOPER, supra note 151, at 10 (“But irrespective of the
content of its decisions, the process of judicial review is not democratic because the Court is
not a politically responsible institution.”).
275. Amanda Frost, Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 768; see
also id. at 765 (“The fact that federal judges are insulated from electoral pressures while
remaining attentive to mainstream public opinion enables them to listen to and be influenced
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None of this is to say that the Supreme Court is immune to ide-
ological distortions (although its roughly balanced ideological
composition has tended to minimize them).276 But it is to say that
electoral accountability is not doing the work we think, and that the
Court’s deficit in this regard is also its advantage. Elected repre-
sentatives respond to power—the voice of those who can make
themselves strategically valuable.277 The Supreme Court responds
to the people en masse, more so as the cacophony of voices converge
into a message that is loud and clear.278 Free of the electoral politics
that distort the representative branches and moved by a dialogic
process of its own, the Court is able to respond to, and reflect, the
people’s widely held views even when the representative branches
do not. 
This ability gives rise to what I have called “upside-down judicial
review,”279 and it is what judicial supremacy does for the people in
a world of democratic dysfunction. Upside-down judicial review is
about the Supreme Court’s ability, at times, to represent the peo-
ple’s views better than the people’s own representatives. Its premise
is that our representative branches are so dysfunctional that the
Supreme Court (ironically) is sometimes a better conduit for the will
of the people than the institutions ostensibly designed for that very
purpose. The Court’s recent recognition of same-sex marriage in
by the majority in a way that elected officials are not.”). 
276. See Lain, supra note 20, at 165 (“On this ideologically balanced Supreme Court, it is
the moderate, swing Justices who matter most in the Court’s decision making, and empirical
evidence has shown these Justices to be highly responsive to changes in public opinion.”
(footnote omitted)); see also James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Legitimacy Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 173
(2015) (noting that “a court closely divided on ideology cannot produce the consistent
decisional fuel needed to ignite a threat to the institution’s legitimacy”).
277. See SAGER, supra note 3, at 205 (“No one can demand to be heard or to have their
interests taken into account unless they can make themselves strategically valuable. In the
real world of popular politics, power, not truth, speaks to power.”).
278. See supra Part I.D. As one reader noted, this comparison suggests that department-
alists are not only mistaken in concluding that the Supreme Court is antidemocratic, but also
that departmentalists are deeply invested in current power structures, counting only those
voices that have electoral power as legitimate and leaving everyone else out.
279. See Lain, supra note 20, at 116 (“Instead of a countermajoritarian Court checking the
majoritarian branches, we see a majoritarian Court checking the not-so-majoritarian branch-
es, enforcing prevailing norms when the representative branches do not. Here marks the start
of a distinctly majoritarian, upside-down understanding of judicial review.”).
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Obergefell v. Hodges280 is one example of this phenomenon; Brown
v. Board of Education281 is another. Both showcase the representa-
tive branches refusing to give force of law to the transformation of
attitudes occurring in larger society, leaving the Court to do it
instead.282
Simply put, soft supremacy offers a safety net for expressing the
people’s evolving constitutional understandings, an assurance that
their constitutional commitments will find expression in the law no
matter what the representative branches do. And in the truest, most
literal sense, it showcases the Supreme Court serving as guardian
of the people’s Constitution against the acts of ordinary government,
just as it was intended to do.283 Again, for those who do not want the
people in the Constitution, this is a bad thing. But I am speaking to
those who do. Soft supremacy is one way, among many, of giving
voice to the people’s views. Democratic expression never looked so
undemocratic, nor has it worked so well.
C. What Soft Supremacy Does for the Representative Branches
Thus far, I have noted the implications of soft supremacy for
departmentalism in discrete places where it has made sense to do
so.284 In this Section, I turn more directly to the departmentalist
position, starting with a discussion of what soft supremacy does for
the representative branches. I begin with a move from the depart-
mentalist playbook—the recognition that judicial supremacy is not
280. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
281. 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954).
282. See Lain, supra note 20, at 119-25 (discussing Brown as an example of upside-down
judicial review); id. at 177-78 (discussing gay marriage as an issue ripe for upside-down
judicial review).
283. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 160, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he
constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention
of their agents.... [W]here the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in
opposition to that of the people, declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed
by the latter, rather than the former.”).
284. See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting that departmentalism would result in
the representative branches having more interpretive power than the Supreme Court because
those branches would have the power to enforce their interpretive positions as well as render
them); supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text (noting that the dysfunction that marks the
representative branches undermines the justification for departmentalism and raises serious
doubts about the representative branches’ ability and inclination to independently interpret
the Constitution).
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a constitutional given.285 The Founders may have contemplated ju-
dicial review, but the same cannot be said of judicial supremacy.286
Why, then, do we have it? To answer this question is to know what
soft supremacy does for the representative branches: we have ju-
dicial supremacy because the representative branches have viewed
it as being in their best interest to do so.
Within the world of political science, the point is well establish-
ed—judicial supremacy is a political construct built over time by the
representative branches to further ends that they would find dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to accomplish on their own.287 As Justin
Crowe concludes in his work on the subject, “to the extent that the
courts and judges have become central to American politics, it is
because elected politicians have actively, repeatedly, and strategi-
cally assisted them in becoming so.”288 The Supreme Court did not
start out powerful, and it certainly did not start out supreme in mat-
ters of constitutional interpretation.289 It became both because
political actors recognized the usefulness of being able to say that
the Supreme Court has spoken and the nation is bound. Of the
285. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1996) (“[N]o one ... has even attempted to put forth
a plausible originalist case for a generalized judicial supremacy in constitutional interpre-
tation. Instead, those who defend judicial supremacy ... have done so on grounds unrelated
to the Constitution’s original public meaning.”).
286. See id. For the most famous statement of the Founders contemplating judicial review,
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 160, at 379 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The interpretation
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and
must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body.”).
287. See JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 11 (2012) (noting that over the course of history, the ways in
which political actors have empowered the Supreme Court and the precise reasons have
varied, “but the overriding purpose has remained constant: to use the judiciary to further
some end that would otherwise be difficult or even impossible to realize”). For prominent
discussions of the point, see generally id.; WHITTINGTON, supra note 3; Gillman, supra note
23; Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise
of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005); see
also Stephen M. Engel, Constructing Courts: Judicial Institutional Change Embedded in
Larger Political Dynamics, or the Importance of No Longer Considering the Judiciary an
Institution Apart, 49 TULSA L. REV. 291 (2013) (book review).
288. CROWE, supra note 287, at 272. 
289. See William H. Rehnquist, Address, The Supreme Court: “The First Hundred Years
Were the Hardest,” 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 476-78 (1988).
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numerous reasons this is so,290 I focus here on the three I see as
most prominent. 
First and foremost, judicial supremacy serves the coordinate
branches by legitimating what they do. The public discourse tends
to focus on cases in which the Supreme Court invalidates a govern-
ment action, but that overlooks the vast majority of cases in which
the Court validates, and indeed entrenches, the government’s ac-
tions instead. As Charles Black put the point, “the prime and most
necessary function of the Court has been that of validation, not that
of invalidation.”291 This is the reason why Congress rarely wants to
actually curb the Supreme Court’s power; the Court’s power is
mostly used to bolster the power Congress claims on its own.292 As
Keith Whittington explains, “politicians recognize the authority of
judges so that the judges can in turn recognize the authority of the
politicians.”293 Put another way, the representative branches sup-
port judicial supremacy because judicial supremacy supports the
vast majority of what they do.
Second, and perhaps most consequentially, judicial supremacy
serves the representative branches by suppressing pockets of po-
litical opposition that are beyond the reach of national legislative
control. Our federal system allows political losers at the national
level to consolidate and exercise power at the state and local levels,
and places limits on the ability of the representative branches to
290. For a plenary discussion, see generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 3; see also HALL,
supra note 180, at 14-15 (listing numerous ways in which judicial power serves the elected
branches and noting the scholars who have written in each of those areas).
291. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 153 (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND
THE COURT 52 (1960)). Given the political nature of the judicial appointments process, and the
ubiquity of the rational basis standard of review, the fact that the Court would generally
validate legislation, rather than invalidate it, should come as no surprise. See supra Parts I.A,
I.B.1 (discussing the judicial appointments process and the rational basis standard).
292. See HALL, supra note 180, at 11 (noting that instead of curbing the Supreme Court’s
power, “[i]t seems much more likely that the elected branches would use the Court as an
instrument of their own power by staffing it with political allies, reaping the benefits of
enhanced legitimacy when the Court is in agreement, and simply ignoring or subverting the
Court when it is not”); see also CROWE, supra note 287, at 275 (“By emphasizing concepts such
as Court-curbing and strategic retreats, then, scholars of judicial politics (and related fields)
have perpetuated a fundamental misconception about the nature of the relationship between
Congress and the Court. That relationship, as the history of judicial institution building
demonstrates, is markedly more supportive than combative.”).
293. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 155. 
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subdue those enclaves of resistance.294 Judicial supremacy offers a
solution to this “regime enforcement” problem, bringing recalcitrant
states into line with the nation’s dominant understanding of what
the Constitution requires.295 The Warren Court is famous for serving
this outlier-suppressing function; indeed, the dominant theme of its
constitutional jurisprudence was enforcing the constitutional order
of 1960s liberalism against the recalcitrant South.296
Third and finally, judicial supremacy provides an alternative
forum for the resolution of conflicts that are too salient and divisive
for the political process to resolve. Some political controversies con-
cern crosscutting issues that threaten to dismantle the political
coalitions that define party lines.297 When confronted with such is-
sues, party leaders do all that they can to remove them from the
political agenda.298 In short, they duck. “Rarely have so many public
294. See Whittington, supra note 287, at 585 (“In a federal system, for example, ideological
and partisan opponents may control policymaking jurisdictions that are insulated from direct
national legislative control.”); see also id. at 586 (“The fragmented American political system
provides ample opportunities for national electoral minorities to nonetheless exercise political
power. Particularly notable is the American federal structure, which allows ideological
outliers and members of the out-party to consolidate and exercise governmental power over
limited geographic jurisdictions.”). 
295. As Keith Whittington notes, the use of judicial supremacy to suppress constitutional
outliers is perhaps the Supreme Court’s most impactful contribution. See WHITTINGTON, supra
note 3, at 105 (“[P]erhaps the most important [judicial role] is one of regime enforcement
against constitutional outliers.”); id. at 106 (“Over the course of its history, the Court has
invalidated state and local laws in nearly 1,100 cases, while voiding congressional statutes
in just over 150 cases.”). Indeed, the vital service that judicial supremacy provided to the
representative branches by suppressing pockets of local opposition—what Barry Friedman
and Erin Delaney call “vertical supremacy”—is what provided the foundation for the Court
to then use judicial supremacy against the representative branches in “horizontal” fashion.
See Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of
Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2011) (providing a legal history
account of this phenomenon). 
296. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000)
(“[T]he dominant motif of the Warren Court is an assault on the South as a unique legal and
cultural region.”). For a discussion of this phenomenon in the criminal procedure context, see
Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?, supra note 119.
297. For an excellent discussion of “crosscutting issues that threaten to disrupt the existing
bases of partisan cleavage” and prominent examples of the phenomenon, see Graber, supra
note 16, at 38; see also Whittington, supra note 287, at 591-93 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s role in overcoming “cross-pressured political coalitions”).
298. See Graber, supra note 16, at 45 (discussing what political scientists call “dis-
placement of conflicts” theory); see also id. at 40 (“When events demonstrate that a potentially
disruptive controversy is not going to vanish, politicians attempt to depoliticize that dispute
by developing or making use of various means of conflict resolution that seem far removed
1682 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1609
officials worked so hard to say so little about an issue on the minds
of so many citizens,” wrote Amy Gutmann about abortion politics
in 1990,299 and the same could be said of the context in which the
Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973.300 At the time, a
majority of Americans—64 percent—supported the availability of
abortion as a matter of personal choice,301 but an intense anti-
abortion lobby made repealing existing abortion prohibitions (which
dated back to the 1880s) exceedingly difficult.302 Legislators could
not afford to vote against the majority position, nor could they afford
to vote for it.303 On the eve of Roe, one New York Times headline said
it all: “Opponents of the Abortion Law Gather Strength in Legisla-
ture: But Many Lawmakers Would Prefer to Let the Courts Settle
Controversy.”304 When politicians face crosscutting pressures that
make it too costly to take a stand one way or the other, the best
stand they can take is no stand at all.
from national electoral politics.”). For an in-depth account of legislative deferrals, see
generally LOVELL, supra note 254.
299. Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 1990, at 43, 43 (review-
ing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).
300. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Lain, supra note 20, at 133-44 (historically contextualizing
Roe v. Wade). 
301. See GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 54 (1978)
(reporting 64 percent of respondents in an August 1972 poll agreeing with the statement, “The
decision to have an abortion should be made solely by a woman and her physician”); see also
Lain, supra note 20, at 135 (“Polling data from the 1960s confirms a decade-long, strong
majoritarian trend. From the early 1960s to January 1973, when Roe was decided, public
support for the prochoice position rose thirty points.”).
302. See Lain, supra note 20, at 140 (“Legislators recounted stories of being confronted with
grisly pictures and aborted fetuses in jars, picketed wherever they went, denounced in their
churches, lobbied in their homes, and threatened with excommunication, political payback,
or both. The problem, as one state legislator explained, was not opposition to the repeal of
abortion restrictions on the merits—‘It’s the political repercussions they fear from the
Catholic opposition.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY:
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 369 (1994))).
303. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
304. William E. Farrell, Opponents of the Abortion Law Gather Strength in Legislature: But
Many Lawmakers Would Prefer to Let the Courts Settle Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1970, at 19; see also GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS,
SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 114 (2009) (quoting Republican Senator Bob Packwood in 1971 as
saying, “[M]ost of the legislators in the nation I have met and certainly many members of
Congress would prefer the Supreme Court to legalize abortion, thereby taking them off the
hook and relieving them of the responsibility for decision-making” (quoting Bob Packwood,
The Role of the Federal Government, 14 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 4, 1213 (1971))).
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In such circumstances, judicial supremacy serves the represen-
tative branches by resolving the issue (at least in the short term)
and allowing party leaders to further remove it from the political
arena by pointing to the binding power of the courts.305 As one
observer notes, “a court order is useful in that it leaves the official
no choice and a perfect excuse.”306 President Eisenhower used ju-
dicial supremacy this way in the wake of Brown.307 President
Kennedy used it this way in the wake of Engel v. Vitale.308 And
President Carter used it this way in the wake of Roe.309 In all three
305. See Graber, supra note 16, at 44 (“Federal justices help maintain the national party
system by removing from the political agenda issues that are disruptive to existing partisan
alignments.”); see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 66 (noting in the context of abortion
that “the optimal political strategy was to maximize the judicial authority to resolve the issue
and remove abortion from the political arena”); id. at 143 (“Elected officials have an incentive
to bolster the authority of the courts precisely in order to distance themselves from any re-
sponsibility for any of its actions.”).
306. ROSENBERG, supra note 162, at 34 (quoting Note, The Courts, HEW, and Southern
School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321, 361 (1967)). 
307. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 146 (“After the Brown decision was issued, the
president determined only to say, ‘The Supreme Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold
the constitutional processes in this country; and I will obey.’”). When a reporter at a press
conference pointed out that Brown had been decided “under the Republican administration,”
Eisenhower distanced himself from the connection, stating,“The Supreme Court, as I under-
stand it, is not under any administration.” Id. (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower, The
President’s News Conference of May 19, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491-92 (1960)); see also
Friedman, supra note 59, at 170-71 (quoting Eisenhower at a press conference after Brown
as stating, “The courts must be sustained or it’s not America” (quoting Anthony Lewis,
Eisenhower Calls Courts’ Sanctity Little Rock Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1957, at 1));
Eisenhower Address on Little Rock Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1957, at 14 (“Our personal
opinions about the decision have no bearing on the matter of enforcement; the responsibility
and authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution are very clear.”).
308. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating state-sponsored school prayer); see Lain, God, Civic
Virtue, and the American Way, supra note 119, at 526 (“At a press conference shortly after
Engel was decided, Kennedy stated: ‘I think that it is important for us if we are going to main-
tain our constitutional principle that we support the Supreme Court decisions even when we
may not agree with them.’” (quoting John F. Kennedy, The President’s News Conference, 1962
PUB. PAPERS 509, 510-11 (June 27, 1962))). This is particularly interesting because Kennedy
did agree with Engel on the merits—he had campaigned on the strict separation of church and
state in the 1960 election; it just was not a good time to say so. See id. at 493.
309. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 66-67 (“[I]n a 1980 press conference, [President]
Carter deferred to the Court.... [H]e insisted that ‘I’m personally against abortion,’ but he
noted, ‘[A]s President I have taken an oath to uphold the laws of the United States as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. So, if the Supreme Court should rule,
as they have, on abortion and other sensitive issues contrary to my own personal beliefs, I
have to carry out, in accordance with my solemn oath and my duties as President, the ruling
of the Supreme Court.’” (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Jimmy Carter, Remarks and
a Question-and-Answer Session During a Live Television Broadcast, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2348,
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of these cases, judicial supremacy was indeed the perfect excuse,
allowing party leaders to distance themselves from the decision on
the merits—and distance the decision from the political process
itself—by pointing to the binding authority of the Supreme Court.
None of this is to say that the representative branches’ use of
judicial supremacy in these ways is necessarily a good thing. One
might reasonably conclude that the Supreme Court should not be
in the business of legitimating most of what the representative
branches do, or that the Court’s outlier-suppressing function is at
odds with the principles that underlie our federalist system, or per-
haps most obviously, that the representative branches should not be
using the courts as a conflict avoidance mechanism. They should be
resolving those conflicts instead.310
But it is to say that the narrative of a power-grabbing Supreme
Court that so often dominates the discourse—what Justin Crowe
describes as “a paranoid skepticism that judicial power was ‘stolen’
from the people and their representatives, that the Court somehow
rose to prominence through manipulative action taken when citi-
zens and politicians were not looking”311—is simply not true. As
Keith Whittington puts the point, “Judicial supremacy is estab-
lished by political invitation, not by judicial putsch.”312 It exists
because political actors seeking to advance their own interests have
2354 (Oct. 20, 1980))). 
310. This is particularly true to the extent that judicial supremacy actually exacerbates
political leaders’ use of the Supreme Court as a release valve, although the phenomenon is
deeply contested. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 295 (“Judicial supremacy facilitates
distortions in representation and accountability. It lets politicians off the hook and encourages
a political sensibility of avoiding constitutional responsibilities. It is not obvious, however,
that our democratic politics would be better absent the temptation of judicial supremacy.
Devices designed to shelter politicians and political decisions from the electorate are
commonplace, and it is not at all clear that such devices should be universally condemned.”).
For opposing views on this debate, see SAGER, supra note 3, at 220 (“If our political life has
slighted these issues or their moral dimension, that is our fault, not the fault of the
constitutional judiciary. If our moral muscle has atrophied, that is because we are political
couch potatoes; there is more than enough room for exercise.”); and TUSHNET, supra note 63,
at 80-82 (discussing “judicial overhang” that distorts the legislative process and undermines
political accountability).
311. CROWE, supra note 287, at 271.
312. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 294; see also Keith E. Whittington, Give “The People”
What They Want?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911, 922 (2006) (“The justices have not hoodwinked
the people and its representatives into accepting judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is
a construction of the people’s representatives and has more often than not been embraced by
the people themselves.”).
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time and again viewed it as useful in solving a variety of political
problems.313 In short, judicial supremacy exists because it serves
departmental needs. 
And so to departmentalists, I say, you are going to want that
supreme Supreme Court back someday. Not even the representative
branches want a world of departmentalism all the time. They might
want it sometimes, but what they want most of the time is judicial
supremacy that is weak enough to be ignored on occasion but strong
enough to suit their needs. In short, what they want is what they
already have, and that is supremacy sometimes—the essence of soft
supremacy.
Before concluding, one more point merits mention for those in-
clined to take a departmentalist view: soft supremacy just might
serve departmentalist aims better. As previously discussed, the rep-
resentative branches have a number of ways to control the efficacy
of Supreme Court rulings with which they disagree.314 When the
people’s representatives choose to take a departmentalist stance
instead—when they choose to take stands in sharp contrast to the
Supreme Court’s constitutional pronouncements under a claim of
equally authoritative interpretive power—they are directly chal-
lenging the Court’s authority and directly attacking its decision on
the merits. That leads to lawsuits, which get resolved in courts,
which equates to handing the judiciary an opportunity to reassert
its supremacy on a silver platter. Given the representative branches’
ability to have their way with the Court’s rulings through a variety
of passive-aggressive responses—responses that leave the courts
with little recourse315—it is not clear why even those who want to
limit the Supreme Court’s control over the Constitution would favor
the departmentalist position. The beauty of soft supremacy, at least
for those sympathetic to the departmentalist view, is that the Court
cannot hit back.
313. See CROWE, supra note 287, at 274 (“[J]udicial power has not increased because of
clueless or feckless behavior but because of strategic and deliberate action. In other words,
politicians have engaged in institution building consciously and tactically, empowering the
judiciary because they saw it in their—and often their constituents’—interests to do so.”).
314. See supra Part II; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 11 (noting “the evident
power of elected government officials to intimidate, co-opt, ignore, or dismantle the judiciary”).
315. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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Keith Whittington has noted just how difficult it is for Congress
to take a departmentalist stance without “enacting a lawsuit” that
invites the reassertion of judicial supremacy,316 and several prom-
inent decisions illustrate the point. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Dickerson v. United States,317 which invalidated Congress’s at-
tempt to legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona318 and asserted
that “Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions in-
terpreting and applying the Constitution,” is one example.319 The
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, which invalidated Con-
gress’s attempt in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to
legislatively overrule one of its decisions under the Free Exercise
Clause, is another.320 There the Supreme Court explained:
When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect
due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.... [I]t is this Court’s
precedent, not RFRA, which must control.321
In short, legislating constitutional conflict is a futile move. The
Supreme Court is the institution that resolves such conflicts, so de-
partmentalists are picking a fight they are going to lose. 
That said, the quintessential case for comparing the virtues of
soft supremacy versus the departmentalist position is 1958’s
Cooper v. Aaron, decided in the wake of Southern resistance to
Brown.322 Recall first the passive-aggressive responses to Brown
316. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 16; see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum,
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1609-15 (2005) (book review) (arguing
that however one might envision departmentalism playing out, it would inevitably suffer from
boundary problems, which would get resolved in the courts, which would “collapse into ju-
dicial supremacy”).
317. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
318. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
319. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437. For a synopsis of Dickerson and the statute it invalidated,
see supra note 196.
320. See 521 U.S. 507, 515 (1997).
321. Id. at 536.
322. See 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), was the law of the land and thus binding on the states).
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by the representative branches. As previously discussed, Congress
considered, and rejected, an enforcement provision for Brown in its
1957 Civil Rights Act, and President Eisenhower quietly declined
several opportunities for federal enforcement.323 The Court could do
nothing but tap its foot and wait for “all deliberate speed.”324
Now consider Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus’s claim in 1957
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown was “‘the law of the
case’ [but] not ‘the law of the land.’”325 Governor Faubus’s depart-
mentalist challenge to judicial supremacy resulted in Eisenhower
sending troops to Little Rock (much to Eisenhower’s chagrin) and
the litigation in Cooper v. Aaron, which the Justices used as an
opportunity to “answer the premise of the actions of the Governor
and Legislature that they are not bound by our holding in the
Brown case.”326 The result was one of history’s most famous dec-
larations of judicial supremacy—the Court’s assertion that “the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution” and that judicial supremacy is “a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”327 This is what
happens when those looking to curb the Court’s power over the
Constitution choose to do so in a way that so obviously invites the
further aggrandizement of that power.
In the end, what soft supremacy does for the representative
branches is more than just serve their political needs. Soft
323. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
324. See Brown II , 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). For a discussion of the enforcement concerns
behind the Court’s decision to order desegregation in this manner, see supra notes 186-90 and
accompanying text.
325. ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON: LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT SHOCKED
THE NATION 154 (2007) (quoting Governor Orval Faubus). 
326. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17. For those tempted to think that Cooper shows the virtues of
departmentalism by inviting the executive branch to weigh in on the controversy rather than
blithely enforcing the Court’s edict, my answer is that the executive branch was not blithely
enforcing the Court’s edict either before Governor Faubus’s stand at Little Rock or after it.
The only time the executive branch enforced the Court’s ruling in the first decade after it was
issued was when a departmentalist forced its hand. And again, it is hard to see how that is
a good thing for departmentalists—particularly in light of the fact that it came with a
reaffirmation of the Court’s supremacy.
327. See id. at 18 (“[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since
been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”).
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supremacy is also a way for the representative branches to control
the Supreme Court’s constitutional decision-making without pro-
voking the sort of confrontation that will land them in court. Here
again, judicial supremacy exists not despite the representative
branches’ interests but because of them. And that should make even
departmentalists think twice about departmentalism. Soft suprem-
acy—weak when the representative branches want it to be, strong
when it serves their needs—is what judicial supremacy offers to the
representative branches. Supremacy sometimes is what they really
want, and that is what they have in soft supremacy. 
CONCLUSION
The practice of judicial supremacy bears little resemblance to the
depiction of rigidity and strength that dominates the discourse in
judicial supremacy debates. It is weak, malleable, and decidedly
democratic in its operation, channeling the will of the people and
contributing to the democratic enterprise in numerous ways. Those
who oppose judicial supremacy on democratic grounds want to put
the people back into the Constitution, but what they fail to realize
is that the people are already there. The people are what puts the
soft in soft supremacy.
